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I. INTRODUCTION
Recently, both Congress and the National Labor Relations Board
("NLRB") have begun to scrutinize the effectiveness of the National Labor Re-
lations Act ("NLRA"). This scrutiny comes on the heels of the complaints of
workers and union representatives over the high incidence of employer unfair
labor practices during elections and the lack of efficient deterrents to such prac-
tices, in particular, the Board's limited make-whole remedies. Complaints from
working class Americans about increasing health costs and decreasing wages
and benefits have added further pressure on Congress and the NLRB to reform
the NLRA.' As a response to these complaints, Congress considered amending
the NLRA with the Employee Free Choice Act ("EFCA"). 2 However, Con-
gress's attempt at providing these benefits for workers through the EFCA is
merely duct tape to fix the larger-scale problems facing American workers, such
as rising health care costs and competing in global markets.
In this Note, I use the example of duct tape to illustrate an analogy of
how the EFCA is much like the quick and temporary solution of duct tape on a
car bumper. For individuals who have struggled to get by and could not always
afford to fix a car or other appliance through formal repairs, duct tape offered a
temporary solution. Duct tape may hold the bumper on the car, but eventually,
through rain and general use, it will be ineffective, and ultimately the car
owner's only true solution is making the proper repairs to the vehicle. Simi-
larly, by simply reforming the NLRA in such a profound and politically moti-
vated fashion, Congress has placed duct tape on the real problems facing work-
ers, such as decreasing wages and increasing health care costs-problems that
the EFCA is unlikely to fix. Although reasonable minds may differ regarding
the role that the NLRA will play in both improving the American economy and
improving the standard of living for working Americans, reforming only the
NLRA, especially in the extreme ways proposed by the EFCA, cannot offer
workers the same outcomes as it did for workers in the 1940s.3
The United States and, more importantly, its system of trade and popu-
lation, has changed drastically since the passage of the NLRA in 1935. For ex-
I Michael Newman & Shane Crase, The Future of Secret Ballot Elections Under the National
Labor Relations Act, 54 MAY FED. LAW. 14,14 (2007) [hereinafter Newman & Crase].
2 See H.R. 800, 110th Cong. (1 st Sess. 2007); S. 104 1, 110th Cong. (1st Sess. 2007); see also
H.R. REP. No. 110-23 (2007) (Conf. Rep.).
3 Eric Tucker, "Great Expectations" Defeated? : The Trajectory of Collective Bargaining
Regimes in Canada and the United States Post-NAFTA, 26 CoMP. LAB. L. & POL'Y J. 97, 147-48
(2004) ("while U.S. collective bargaining law has not been racing downward, increased global
competitiveness has changed the labor market in ways that are antithetical to its ability to promote
collective bargaining and promote workers' freedom of association. The growing mismatch be-
tween law and the social reality in which it operates produces greater regulatory failure.").
[Vol. I111
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ample, rather than producing most consumer goods within the United States, our
country now trades globally and imports on a much grander scale from other
countries.4 Additionally, while the workers in the late 1930s and early 1940's
primarily worked in manufacturing, today America's economy is primarily ser-
vice-based. In a much more technological age, the average American business
and worker are no longer competing domestically to be the most efficient;
American workers and businesses are competing globally. 6 Furthermore, Amer-
ica is getting older, causing a greater need for pensions and health care to pro-
vide for American workers when they retire or become ill.
7
Simply put, in present-day, the NLRA is no longer achieving its goals
of improving the plight of American workers and bettering the American econ-
omy. 8 Over the past few years, politicians, American voters, and interest groups
representing both labor and business, have been involved in a heated debate
over the future of American labor law. While these groups complain of many
matters, such as the lack of protection for workers, the political oscillation of the
Board, the inefficiency of the administrative process in dealing with complaints
at the Board,9 and the lack of appropriate remedies needed to remedy unfair
4 Id.
5 See generally Michael Urquhart, U.S. Dep't of Lab., The Employment Shift to Services:
Where Did it Come From? 107 MONTHLY LAB. REV. ONLINE 4 (1984),
http://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/1984/04/art2full.pdf.
6 See generally KATHERINE V.W. STONE, FROM WIDGETS To DIGITS: EMPLOYMENT
REGULATION FOR THE CHANGING WORKPLACE 120-21 (2004) ("The labor law of the 1930s were
written in the industrial era, and used industrial era labor relations as the template for the em-
ployment relationship they were intended to regulate. The present system of labor and employ-
ment law thus assumes the existence of strong firm-worker attachment, long-term jobs, and pro-
motion ladders to define progress throughout a career. Indeed, for most of the twentieth century,
the law and the institutions governing work in America have been based on the assumption that
workers were employed in stabled jobs by corporations that valued long-term attachment between
the corporation and the worker-that is, based on the internal labor market model of employ-
ment.").
7 See generally Roger Lowenstein, The End of Pensions? N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30, 2005, §6
(Magazine), at 56.
8 William B. Gould, Independent Adjudication, Political Process, and the State of Labor-
Management Relations: The Role of the National Labor Relations Board, 82 IND. L.J. 461, 496
(2007) ("the failure of the United States to adopt comprehensive health care legislation has placed
some corporations at a competitive disadvantage with companies abroad, and sometimes, with
nonunion domestic employers. (citation omitted). Corporations in both the developed and under-
developed world outside the United States do not make the substantial contributions to medical
care and pension payments to workers covered by collective bargaining agreements, as is the case
with American employers in the United States. In the main, such assistance is provided by the
government. It is difficult to see how labor law reform, or indeed union organizational activity
outside the law, alone can make a significant contribution under these circumstances when organ-
ized American companies are at such a competitive disadvantage.") (internal citations omitted).
9 Id. at 470-71 (discussing both the policy oscillation and dereliction of duty of the Bush II
Board in dealing with the NLRB complaint processes).
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labor practices,' ° political ideologies from the Republican and Democratic par-
ties have caused a standstill in the path toward reform that has left working-class
Americans out in the cold.
This past term, Republican Senators led the filibuster to prevent a vote
on the EFCA and effectively eliminated the ability of the Senate to vote on and
pass the EFCA. 1 Likewise, members of Congress affiliated with the Democ-
ratic Party also aided in failing to secure American workers the much needed
reform to the remedial powers of the NLRA. The Democrats pushed the EFCA
as a package deal and would not yield on some particularly pro-union proposed
amendments in the EFCA, 12 such as potentially mandatory arbitration and union
certification upon a simple majority showing on a card check. Because Con-
gress has yet to provide a remedy for the nation's health care crisis or pass more
advantageous labor laws that would encourage rather than discourage American
firms to employ American workers, both the card check and arbitration and me-
diation provisions would likely increase the numbers in unions for a time, and
could eventually harm rather than help the economic position of the American
worker. After the first session of the 110th Congress, the American worker was
ultimately left with no reform and no relief.
It is my proposition that Congress should amend the NLRA to provide
the Board with more effective remedial powers not only to deter employers
from violating the NLRA, but also to promote more efficiency in Board opera-
tions. Accordingly, if those members of Congress who are proponents of in-
creasing the standard of living for working-class Americans truly seek to aid
these workers, because of both passive and active deregulation of labor law, it
must do more to achieve the same positive results for workers that prompted the
enactment of the Wagner Act in 1935-that of improving the position of work-
ers so that those workers could then, in turn, revitalize the economy and provide
for economic prosperity and a higher standard of living for Americans.1
3
1o See generally Robert M. Worster, Note, If It's Hardly Worth Doing, It's Hardly Worth
Doing Right: How the NLRA 's Goals are Defeated Through Inadequate Remedies, 38 U. RICH. L.
REv. 1073 (2004).
"1 See 153 CONG. REC. S8378-02, (daily ed. June 27, 2007); see also Steven Greenhouse, Sen-
ate Republicans Block Bill on Unionizing, N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 2007, at A21; Fawn Johnson,
Moderate Republicans Will Check 'No' on Card Check Bill, CONG. DAILY AM, June 20, 2007.
12 For example, on March 1, 2007, Republicans in the House of Representatives presented two
amendments intended to protect employees who wished not to be asked to sign union authoriza-
tion cards. Rep. McKeon (R-CA) introduced an amendment that would have prohibited union
recognition via card check, requiring instead a secret ballot election by the NLRB. Rep. Foxx (R-
NC) would have required the NLRB to promulgate standards and a model notice for an employee
to put himself or herself on a 'do not call or contact' list to avoid union solicitation. Both of these
amendments were struck down by a vote of 173 yeas to 256 nays. See 153 CONG. REC. H2043,
H2082-89 (McKeon Amendment) and H2080-88 (Foxx Amendment), as reprinted in H.R. REP.
No. 110-26 (2007) (Conf. Rep.).
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The purpose of this Note is to explain how the proposed EFCA was es-
sentially duct tape for the problems facing American workers that could not
have had the same impact on American workers in the United States in the
twenty-first century because labor law has been both passively and actively de-
regulated by Congress, the NLRB, the Courts, and other factors such as global-
ization. Part H of this Note will describe the theoretical underpinnings of the
NLRA, as well as the society that existed at the time Congress enacted the
NLRA. Part III will analyze how both passive and active deregulation of labor
law have made the alterations to the NLRA proposed in the EFCA antithetical to
achieving the sweeping changes that EFCA's advocates believe its enactment
can bring. Part IV will review the amendments to the NLRA that are proposed
in the EFCA, discuss the potential effects of such amendments, state my opinion
on the various provisions, and suggest other amendments that could more read-
ily ensure both employee free choice and a better standard of living for working
Americans. Finally, Part V, will offer comments and suggestions on why and
how Congress should use the discussion surrounding the EFCA to identify cur-
rent regulatory failures and secure more effective protections for the American
worker.
II. THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT: A CONGRESSIONAL ACTION
INTENDED TO COMBAT MARKETPLACE FAILURE
When the Wagner Act became law in 1935, Congressmen thought that
by guaranteeing workers the right to organize and remedying the inequality of
bargaining power between an employer and his employees, the employees could
bargain for and perhaps receive more favorable terms and conditions of em-
ployment. This Act, as part of other New Deal Era reforms, was intended to
place money in the hands of workers, who would in turn spend money and rein-
vigorate the economy after the Great Depression.' 4 Generally, the Wagner Act
worked very well for about a decade after its enactment, but because of both
amendments to the Act and advances in technology, communication, and trans-
portation, employers could, with increasing success, pressure workers to accept
less favorable terms and conditions of employment because the employer could
potentially move its workforce or hire permanent replacement workers if the
employees decided to engage in a strike.15 The purpose of this section is to ex-
14 See infra note 22.
15 See STONE, supra note 6. See also Anne Marie Lofaso, September Massacre: The Latest
Battle in the War on Workers' Rights Under the National Labor Relations Act 1-2 (May 2008)
(working paper, on file with the AM. CONST. SOC'Y FOR L. AND POL'Y), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=l 133607 [hereinafter September Massacre] ("Notwithstanding the fun-
damentally progressive nature of Section 7, the protective power of the original NLRA, as enacted
in 1935 (popularly called "the Wagner Act"), has been eroded by congressional amendments,
coupled with successive interpretations of the courts and the National Labor Relations Board ("the
NLRB")-the very agency tasked by Congress with protecting workers' rights. By weakening the
5
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amine the current economic situation in the United States not only to explain
why the Wagner Act worked so well until the late 1940's, but also to later ex-
plain why current economic realities in the United States are antithetical to the
National Labor Relations Act's intended function of improving both the Ameri-
can economy and the standard of living for American workers.
A. Precursors to the NLRA
The Great Depression dramatically altered the American economy and
swallowed the previous wage floor and livelihoods of the typical American
worker. 16 "National income plummeted from $81 billion in 1929 to $49 billion
in 1932, with wages sustaining the greatest losses."'17 Moreover, "[d]uring the
Great Depression, the average number of hours per workweek for production
workers in manufacturing dropped as low as 34.6," compared to fifty-three
hours in 1900.18 In response, many U.S. firms followed the "welfare capital-
ism" theories of the 1920s, and tried to forestall wage reductions and layoffs
that appeared inevitable.' 9 Subsequently, in the fall of 1931, U.S. Steel cut the
wages of its employees, and the automobile, textile, and rubber tire industries
cut wages shortly thereafter.20 "The highest rates of unemployment came during
the Great Depression, when there were rates above 20 percent for several years.
In 1933, there were more than 12 million workers unemployed; and the unem-
ployment rate averaged 24.9 percent.",
2'
Accordingly, in 1932 the Democrats gained control of the United States
House of Representatives on the promise that they would put an end to the eco-
nomic troubles of the American people.22 As part of the list of government pro-
grams commonly referred to in history books as "alphabet soup," Congress en-
acted the National Industrial Recovery Act ("NIRA") in June of 1933.23 How-
ever, the right of employees to organize collectively was an afterthought of the
NIRA, which was enacted on the premise of eliminating unfair, cut-throat com-
NLRA's protective power, all three branches of the government have legally and economically
disempowered unions and thus weakened their capacity to protect the working class.").
16 MICHAEL C. HARPER, SAMUEL EsTREIcHER & JOAN FLYNN, LABOR LAW: CASES, MATERIALS,
AND PROBLEMS 80 (6th ed. 2007) [hereinafter HARPER, ESTREICHER & FLYNN].
17 Id.
18 DONALD M. FISK, Report on the American Workforce: American Labor in the 20th Century,
COMPENSATION AND WORKING CONDITIONS ONLINE 4 (2001),
http://www.bls.gov/opub/cwc/archive/fall200l art 1.pdf.
19 HARPER, ESTREICHER & FLYNN, supra note 16, at 80.
20 Id.
21 Fisk, supra note 18, at 4-5.
22 HARPER, ESTREICHER & FLYNN, supra note 16. See also STONE, supra note 6, at 119-24
(discussing the foundation of the NLRA).
23 THE AMERICAN PEOPLE: CREATING A NATION AND A SOCIETY 833 (Gary B. Nash et al. eds.,
HarperCollins 2d ed. 1990) [hereinafter THE AMERICAN PEOPLE].
[Vol. I111
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petition among businesses and stabilizing prices in the marketplace.24 The Act
required private trade associations to submit codes of fair competition to the
National Recovery Association.25 Additionally, the NIRA functioned as a
predecessor to the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 ("FLSA"), 26 as it called for
27the establishment of both a minimum wage and maximum hours provision.
B. The National Labor Relations Act:28 Enactment and Purpose
President Roosevelt signed the NLRA into law on July 5, 1935.29 The
NLRA, as well as the other labor-friendly measures the Roosevelt administra-
tion created during the New Deal Era aided in increasingly union membership
from under three million workers in 1933 to 4.5 million workers in 1935. 30 In
1935, because of the historic "switch in time that saved nine," of Justice Rob-
erts,31 the Supreme Court upheld the Act in the famous case NLRB v. Jones &
Laughlin Steel Corporation.32 By the 1940s, due in part to worker movements
within both the American Federation of Labor ("AFL") and Congress of Indus-
trial Organizations ("CIO"), as well as the climate in favor of labor organiza-
tion, over twelve million workers were organized.33
24 HARPER, ESTREICHER & FLYNN, supra note 16, at 80-81.
25 The Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-19 (2007). The FLSA provides for both a
minimum wage and maximum hours provision for employees and employers covered by the Act,
as well as restricting child labor. See THE AMERICAN PEOPLE, supra note 23.
26 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-19 (2006). In A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S.
495 (1935), the Supreme Court unanimously held the NIRA unconstitutional as violating the
separation of powers and congressional authority under the Commerce Clause. Nonetheless, the
NIRA's ambitious provisions were later incorporated into the NLRA. See THE AMERICAN
PEOPLE, supra note 23, at 827; see also HOWARD ZINN, A PEOPLE'S HISTORY OF THE UNITED
STATES: 1492-PRESENT, 393 (5th ed., 2006).
27 For those covered by the FLSA, the Act prohibits child labor and sets minimum wages and
maximum hours. See THE AMERICAN PEOPLE, supra note 23, at 841.
28 The Wagner Act, PUB. L. No. 74-198,49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C.
§§ 151-69) (2006)).
29 Roosevelt Signs the Wagner Bill as 'Just to Labor,' N.Y.TIMES, July 6, 1935, at 1.
30 THE AMERICAN PEOPLE, supra note 23, at 833.
31 Jenny Miao Jiang, Note, Regulating Litigation Under the Protection of Lawful Commerce in
Arms Act: Economic Activity or Regulatory Nullity? 70 ALB. L. REv. 537, 545 (2007). ("Presi-
dent Roosevelt's Court-packing plan and Justice Roberts's well-timed 'switch in time that saved
nine' fundamentally altered the Court's trajectory and led to a vast expansion in the scope of the
Commerce Clause."). Id.
32 301 U.S. 1 (1937). See also ZINN, supra note 26, at 399-406 (discussing the enactment of
the NLRA, the subsequent Supreme Court decision finding the Act constitutional, and unions'
success during the years immediately following Congress's enactment of the NLRA).
33 HARPER, ESTREICHER & FLYNN, supra note 16, at 84-85. But see ZINN, supra note 26, at 402
(noting that while union membership rose drastically during the 1940's, the power of unions di-
minished due to strict NLRB controls).
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The NLRA "was initially conceived of as the free market solution to
market failures in individual bargaining., 34 As outlined in Section 1 of the Act,
the primary purposes of the NLRA include "promoting industrial peace," deal-
ing with "inequality of bargaining power" between generally weaker-positioned
employees and generally stronger-positioned employers, and protecting com-
merce by guaranteeing employees the right to "organize and bargain collec-
tively., 35 However, the preamble to the Act does not encompass all of the fac-
tors that congressmen sought to change with the Wagner Act. Accordingly, al-
though the five-member NLRB tends to emphasize "promoting industrial peace"
in its decisions interpreting the Act, most commentators not only agree with the
proposition that the NLRB has both misstated the purposes of Act, but also
34 Anne Marie Lofaso, Toward a Foundational Theory of Workers' Rights: The Autonomous
Dignified Worker, 76 UMKC L. REv. 1,58 (2007).
35 Section 1 of the National Labor Relations Act, as it originally appeared in the Wagner Act,
states:
The denial by employers of the right of employees to organize and the refusal
by employers to accept the procedure of collective bargaining lead to strikes
and other forms of industrial strike or unrest, which have the intent or the nec-
essary effect of burdening or obstructing commerce by (a) impairing the effi-
ciency, safety, or operation of the instrumentalities of commerce; (b) occur-
ring in the current of commerce; (c) materially affecting, restraining, or con-
trolling the flow of raw materials or manufactured or processed goods from or
into the channels of commerce, or the prices of such materials or goods in
commerce; or (d) causing diminution of employment and wages in such low
volume as substantially to impair or disrupt the market for goods flowing from
or into the channels of commerce.
The inequality of bargaining power between employees who do not possess
full freedom of association or actual liberty of contract, and employers who
are organized in the corporate or other forms of ownership association sub-
stantially burdens and affects the flow of commerce, and tends to aggravate
recurrent business depressions, by depressing wage rates and purchasing
power of wage earners in industry and by preventing the stabilization of com-
petitive wage rates and working conditions within and between industries.
Experience has proved that protection by law of the right of employees to or-
ganize and bargain collectively safeguards commerce from injury, impair-
ment, or interruption, and promotes the flow of commerce by removing cer-
tain recognized sources of industrial strife and unrest, by encouraging prac-
tices fundamental to the friendly adjustment of industrial disputes arising out
of differences as to wages, hours, or other working conditions, and by restor-
ing equality of bargaining power between employers and employees.
It is hereby declared to be the policy of the United States to eliminate the
causes of certain substantial obstructions to the free flow of commerce and to
mitigate and eliminate these obstructions when they have occurred by encour-
aging the practice and procedure of collective bargaining and by protecting
the exercise of workers of full freedom of association, self-organization, and
designation of representatives of their own choosing, for the purpose of nego-
tiating the terms and conditions of their employment or other mutual aid or
protection.
PuB. L. No. 74-198, § 1, 49 Stat. 449, 449-50 (1935).
[Vol. I111
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agree that Senator Wagner primarily envisioned the NLRA as the weapon
against monopolies and big business, which would both restore fairness in the
workplace and redistribute wealth from the hands of a few rich businessmen to
the hands of consumers. Senator Wagner believed that this would serve the dual
purposes of reinvigorating and bringing the country out of the Great Depres-
sion.36
Unique to American labor law is the assumption, implicit in the Act it-
self, "that the inequality of bargaining power can be corrected by protecting
workers' ability to obtain collective representation." 37 In fact, there is no statu-
tory provision that allows the NLRB to set the terms of the collective bargaining
agreement.38 Additionally, although both the original and current NLRA39 re-
quire good faith bargaining, Senator Wagner initially abstained from writing
such a requirement into the Act, because he did not intend for the Act to require
compulsory arbitration of labor disputes.4n
Currently, however, labor leaders and labor-backed congressmen have
sought to amend the NLRA with the EFCA to require just that-arbitration-in
addition to provisions that would grant stronger remedial powers to the Board
and create a mechanism to certify a union based on a majority of authorization
cards rather than a Board-supervised election.4' Unfortunately, however, it is
unlikely that the EFCA, as its proponents presented it to Congress in 2007, will
either ensure free choice of American workers or improve the standard of living
for American workers in the same way that the Wagner Act did after its enact-
ment.
36 See supra note 29 and accompanying text; see also CHRISTOPHER L. TOMLINs, THE STATE
AND THE UNIONS: LABOR RELATIONS, LAW, AND THE ORGANIZED LABOR MOVEMENT IN AMERICA,
1880-1960, 103-40 (1985).
37 Id.
38 See H.K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 297 U.S. 99, 108 (1970) (noting that the Act places limits on
the parties' freedom of contract, as in the employer's limited options in choosing a representative,
but the Board lacks the authority to compel the employer's agreement).
39 The Senate labor committee worked diligently to
dispel any possible false impression that this bill is designed to compel the
making of agreements or to permit governmental supervision of their terms. It
must be stressed that the duty to bargain collectively does not carry with it the
duty to reach an agreement, because the essence of collective bargaining is
that either party shall be free to decide whether proposals made to it are satis-
factory.
S. REP. No. 74-573, at 8 (1935), reprinted in 2 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL
LABOR RELATIONS ACT OF 1935, at 2312 (1985).
40 J. GROSS, THE MAKING OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD: A STUDY IN
ECONOMICS, POLITICS AND THE LAW, 1933-1937, 137 (1974).
41 See discussion infra Parts IV.A & B.2.
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C. The Triumph of the American Workers under the Wagner Act from
1935-1947
At approximately the same time the Wagner Act was enacted, society
created an expectation that a man should be able to work for one company for
life, and, in turn, that company would take care of him when he could no longer
work.42 Additionally, unions fared quite well under the formal election proce-
dure of the NLRB when the Act first took effect. In the 1940s, NLRB elections
involved more than one million employee voters annually, unions won ap-
proximately eighty percent of these elections, and approximately thirty-five
percent of the non-agricultural workforce was unionized.43 Furthermore, be-
cause most employment was in industrial or manufacturing fields, unlike the
services-based economy that exists in present day,44 employers found it difficult
to either move their operations or find a work force willing to work for lower
wages and benefits.45 Additionally, because advances in technology, communi-
cation, and transportation had not yet reached a level that would permit employ-
ers to easily move their operations and obtain a new workforce, unions were
highly successful because they could "take wages out of the competition,"
6
whose workforce was also likely to unionize.
Health care was not a very important issue during this era, because em-
ployers could afford to provide unionized workers with company benefits such
as health care and retirement pensions, and a substantial proportion of elderly
individuals lived with their children or other relatives when they became too ill
or infirm to work.47 Moreover, because of the high number of workers under
these retirees from the baby boom, who provided both increased wealth and
productivity to these companies, the companies could afford to provide benefits
for the retired workers.48 Additionally, Social Security was just a supplement to
other aid to retirees, and benefits were only given to a very small proportion of
that population not only because families traditionally aided in both supporting
and caring for elderly family members, but also because the employer-provided
42 Robert R. Trumble & Deborah Bigdely, Pensions, Health Care, and Workforce Planning:
The Baby Boom Impact, J. COMPENSATION & BENEFITS, May-June 2004, at 15.
43 Paul C. Weiler, Promises to Keep: Securing Workers' Rights to Self-Organization Under
the NLRA, 96 HARv. L. REv. 1769, 1771, 1775 (1983).
44 Fisk, supra note 18 (citing U.S. Bureau of the Census, Historical Statistics of the United
States, Colonial Times to 1970, Part 1, Series D 152-66, at 138 and U.S. Bureau of the Census,
Statistical Abstract of the United States: 2000, tables 656 and 682, at 410, 426) ("Service indus-
tries were the growth sector during the 20th century, jumping from 31 percent of workers in 1900
to 78 percent in 1999.").
45 Samuel Estreicher, Labor Reform in a World of Competitive Product Markets, 69 Cm.-
KENT L. REv. 3, 13 (1993).
46 Id.
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generous retirement and health care benefits.49 Accordingly, when those same
New Deal reformers that enacted the Wagner Act implemented Social Security
legislation in the United States in the mid-1930's, the life expectancy for the
average American was sixty-one years and seven months.50 Congress set sixty-
five as the age for benefits to kick in because those over sixty-five constituted
less than seven percent of the population and were not expected to live more
than twelve years longer.51
Today, as the majority of the work force realizes that Social Security as
it was implemented in previous years is unlikely to be available to them in their
old age, employer-granted retirement and health care benefits have become both
increasingly more important and more costly. In particular, the employees now
have to rely on these benefits being provided by either their employer or them-
selves.52 But, because Congress has neither amended the NLRA nor enacted or
modified other federal laws in the seventy-plus years since the passage of the
Wagner Act, workers are no longer in a position to ensure that they will be pro-
vided for in their old age either by gaining such benefits from their employer by
unionization or by receiving such benefits from the government.53 Therefore,
drastic reform to the NLRA alone can no longer provide the same benefits it
could promise workers in the 1930s and 1940s when unionization was at its
peak.54 Workers are now competing globally with other labor markets and em-
ployers can easily outsource most services-based jobs.55 Moreover, as the aver-
age American person is living longer, these workers need health care and pen-
sion benefits for a much longer period.56
I. ACTIVE AND PASSIVE DEREGULATION OF LABOR LAW
Critics of the NLRA have blamed the current economic situation of
American workers and the increasingly lower percentage of unionized work
forces on various factors. However, unlike the proponents of the EFCA seem to
indicate, the lower rates of unionization are only partially attributable to the
49 Id. (quoting BEVERLY GOLDBERG, AGE WORKS: WHAT CORPORATE AMERICA MUST Do To
SURVIVE THE GRAYING OF THE WORKFORCE 89 (2000)).
50 Id.
51 Id.
52 Fisk, supra note 18, at 4 (citing Bureau of Lab. Stat., U.S. Dep't of Lab., Employer Costs
for Employer Compensation, 1986-99, text table 1, at 2 (1995) and U.S. Bureau of the Census,
Historical Statistics of the United States, Colonial Times to 1970, Part 1, Series D 905-12, at 174-
75. (In 1999, benefits provided to employees averaged $5.58 per hour, or 27.5 percent of total
compensation. In contrast, compensation data for 1929, the first year measured, indicates that
benefits averaged little more than one percent of total compensation.).
53 See discussion infra Part III.
54 See generally ZINN, supra note 26, at 399-403.
55 See STONE, supra note 6 and accompanying text.
56 See infra Part ifI.
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actions of unscrupulous employers who intentionally violate the NLRA to
thwart unionization efforts.57 Accordingly, because the current rates of unioni-
zation are only partially attributable to the unscrupulous employers' unfair labor
practices, reducing the frequency of employer unfair labor practices can only
provide an incomplete solution to the American working class's poor economic
situation. As I will describe in this part of my Note, both passive and active
deregulation of labor law have contributed to the lower rates of unionization.
Additionally, as I will discuss in the remaining sections of this Note, because
various factors have attributed to lower rates of unionization and lower stan-
dards of living for working Americans, laws other than the NLRA must be en-
acted or amended to contribute to the same sweeping change that the Wagner
Act was able to provide for workers in the 1940s.
A. Active Deregulation of Labor Law: The Taft-Hartley Act and ERISA
As I will refer to it in this Note, the active deregulation of labor law is
defined as when Congress has specifically amended the NLRA (e.g., when it
removed economic weapons from employees 58 and removed certain groups of
employees from the protection of the Act by passing the 1947 Taft-Hartley
Amendments),59 or enacted federal legislation, such as the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA").60
As it was originally enacted in 1935, the NLRA61 listed just employer,
rather than union, unfair labor practices, while failing to limit employees' right
to strike any further than provided for in other federal laws such as the Sherman
Anti-Trust Act,62 the Clayton Act,63 and the Norris-LaGuardia Act.64 For exam-
ple, when the Wagner Act was passed in 1935, Section 7 of the Act read: "Em-
ployees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor
organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own
choosing, and to engage in concerted activities, for the purpose of collective
bargaining or other mutual aid or protection. 65 Additionally, Section 13 of the
57 See Worster, supra note 10, at 1089-90.
58 See infra notes 75-82 and accompanying text.
59 Labor Management Relations Act, 1947 (Taft-Hartley Act), ch. 120, 61 Stat. 136 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C.). See also September Massacre, supra note 15, at
8-9.
60 PUB. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 and 29
U.S.C.).
61 National Labor Relations Act, PUB. L. No. 74-198, 49 Stat. 449 (1935).
62 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (2006)).
63 PUB. L. No. 63-212, ch. 323, 38 Stat. 730 (1914) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-
27 and §§ 52-53 (2006)).
64 PuB. L. No. 72-65, ch. 90, 47 Stat. 70 (1932) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-15
(2006)).
65 49 Stat. 449, 452.
[Vol. I111
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Act stated: "Nothing in this Act shall be construed so as to interfere with or im-
pede or diminish in any way the right to strike."66 Seemingly then, one could
reasonably argue that Congress, when writing the plain language of the Wagner
Act, had already carefully balanced the purpose of promoting industrial peace
and remedying inequality of bargaining power,67 with workers' ability to strike.
This right to strike was slowly eroded away, 68 however, beginning with
the Supreme Court's dictum in NLRB v. MacKay Radio & Telegraph Com-
pany,69 which stated that employers had such a right to hire permanent replace-
ment workers to continue operations when the employer's workers were engag-
66 Id. at 457.
67 Section 1 of the National Labor Relations Act, as it originally appeared in the Wagner Act,
stated:
The denial by employers of the right of employees to organize and the refusal
by employers to accept the procedure of collective bargaining lead to strikes
and other forms of industrial strike or unrest, which have the intent or the nec-
essary effect of burdening or obstructing commerce by (a) impairing the effi-
ciency, safety, or operation of the instrumentalities of commerce; (b) occur-
ring in the current of commerce; (c) materially affecting, restraining, or con-
trolling the flow of raw materials or manufactured or processed goods from or
into the channels of commerce, or the prices of such materials or goods in
commerce; or (d) causing diminution of employment and wages in such low
volume as substantially to impair or disrupt the market for goods flowing from
or into the channels of commerce.
The inequality of bargaining power between employees who do not possess
full freedom of association or actual liberty of contract, and employers who
are organized in the corporate or other forms of ownership association sub-
stantially burdens and affects the flow of commerce, and tends to aggravate
recurrent business depressions, by depressing wage rates and purchasing
power of wage earners in industry and by preventing the stabilization of com-
petitive wage rates and working conditions within and between industries.
Experience has proved that protection by law of the right of employees to or-
ganize and bargain collectively safeguards commerce from injury, impair-
ment, or interruption, and promotes the flow of commerce by removing cer-
tain recognized sources of industrial strife and unrest, by encouraging prac-
tices fundamental to the friendly adjustment of industrial disputes arising out
of differences as to wages, hours, or other working conditions, and by restor-
ing equality of bargaining power between employers and employees.
It is hereby declared to be the policy of the United States to eliminate the
causes of certain substantial obstructions to the free flow of commerce and to
mitigate and eliminate these obstructions when they have occurred by encour-
aging the practice and procedure of collective bargaining and by protecting
the exercise by workers of full freedom of association, self-organization, and
designation of representatives of their own choosing, for the purpose of nego-
tiating the terms and conditions of their employment or other mutual aid or
protection.
Id. at 449-50.
68 Lofaso, supra note 34, at 57-58.
69 304 U.S. 333 (1938).
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ing in a strike.70 Even though the Board could have articulated the rule, as a
reasonable interpretation of the plain language of the Act, and the Supreme
Court may have sustained the position that employers could not hire permanent
replacements, absent some pre-showing of a business justification, the Board
conceded the right of employers to hire permanent replacements in its brief,
71
and the Supreme Court stated such a right existed in its dictum in the Mackay
Radio case. 72 The Court removed further economic weapons from workers in
1939, when "[w]ithin two years of declaring the National Labor Relations Act
constitutional, the Supreme Court essentially banned sit-down strikes by work-
ers protesting unfair labor practices, on the theory that the workers had inter-
fered with the employer's property rights. 73
Strikes were powerful economic weapons for employees to use against
their employers to gain bargaining concessions in the 1940s. For example, in
late 1945 and during the year 1946, nearly five million workers were involved
in strikes.74 In response to the high percentage of strikes, a Republican Con-
gress, over the veto of President Harry Truman, further eroded away the right to
strike with the 1947 Taft-Hartley Amendments,75 which eliminated workers'
ability to engage in the secondary boycott or jurisdictional strikes over work
76 Athassignments, required the Board to seek injunctions in secondary boycott cases
70 Id. at 345-46. The Court held that although the Act in no way limits workers' right to strike,
it does not follow that an employer.., has lost the right to protect and con-
tinue his business by supplying places left vacant by strikers. And he is not
bound to discharge those hired to fill the places of strikers .... The assurance
[that replacement workers' positions] might be permanent was not an unfair
labor practice.
71 In its reply brief in Mackay Radio, the Board seemingly conceded the right of employers to
hire permanent replacement workers when its employees engaged in a strike, despite the fact that
the Board could have reasonably articulated another position, when considering both Sections 7
and 13 of the Act in tandem, that an employer could not hire such permanent replacements be-
cause doing so would both interfere with the right to strike guaranteed in Section 13 and restrain
the rights of employees when engaging in a strike under Section 7. See Reply Brief for the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board (Apr. 5, 1939), available at 1939 WL 48681 at *13-19. See also
September Massacre, supra note 15 at 8-9.
72 See supra note 70.
73 Lofaso, supra note 34, at 59 (citing NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306 U.S. 240
(1939)).
74 See R. ALTON LEE, EIsENHowER & LANDRUM GRiFFIN: A STUDY IN LABOR MANAGEMENT
PoLrIcs 4-5 (1990).
75 The Taft-Hartley Amendments, 61 Stat. 136 (1947).
76 Subsection (b)(4) was added to Section 8 in 1947, eliminating the ability of workers to
lawfully engage in secondary boycotts under the Act:
(4) to engage in, or to induce or encourage the employees of any employer to
engage in, a strike or a concerted refusal in the course of their employment to
use, manufacture, process, transport, or otherwise handle or work on any
goods, articles, materials, or commodities or to perform any services, where
an object thereof is-
[Vol. I111
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that the Board deemed meritorious,77 and eliminated employees considered su-
pervisors from the protection of the Act.78 In 1959, Congress further amended
the Act with the Landrum-Griffin Amendments,7 9 adding both Section 8(e),8°
(A) forcing or requiring any employer or self-employed person to join any la-
bor or employer organization or any employer or other person to cease using,
selling, handling, transporting, or otherwise dealing in the products of any
other producer, processor, or manufacturer, or to cease doing business with
any other person
(B) forcing or requiring any other employer to recognize or bargain with a la-
bor organization as the representative of his employees unless such labor or-
ganization has been certified as the representative of such employees under
the provisions of section 9;
(C)forcing or requiring any employer to recognize or bargain with a particular
labor organization as the representative of his employees if another labor or-
ganization has been certified as the representative of such employees under
the provisions of section 9;
(D) forcing or requiring any employer to assign particular work to employees
in a particular labor organization or in a particular trade, craft, or class rather
than to employees in another labor organization or in another trade, craft, or
class, unless such employer is failing to conform to an order or certification of
the Board determining the bargaining representative for employees perform-
ing such work.
61 Stat. 136 (1947).
77 The Taft-Hartley Amendments (currently codified at 29 U.S.C. § 160(1) (2007)).
78 The Taft-Hartley Amendments amended Subsection 2(3) of the Act, to read:
The term "employee" shall include any employee, and shall not be limited to
the employees of a particular employer, unless the Act explicitly states other-
wise, and shall include any individual whose work has ceased as a conse-
quence of, or in connection with, any current labor dispute or because of any
unfair labor practice, and who has not obtained any other regular and substan-
tially equivalent employment, but shall not include any individual employed
as an agricultural laborer, or in the domestic service of any family or person at
his home, or any individual employed by his parent or spouse, or individual
having the status of an independent contractor, or any individual employed as
a supervisor, or any individual employed by an employer subject to the Rail-
way Labor Act, as amended from time to time, or by any person who is not an
employer as herein defined.
(Emphasis added to original to indicate language added to the Act as a result of the 1947 amend-
ments).
The Taft-Hartley Amendments also added Subsection 2(11) to the Act to define a supervisor as:
... any individual having authority, in the interest of the employer, to hire,
transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, promote, discharge, assign, reward, or disci-
pline other employees, or responsibly to direct them, or to adjust their griev-
ances, or effectively to recommend such action, if in connection with the fore-
going the exercise of such authority is not of a merely routine or clerical na-
ture, but requires the use of independent judgment.
61 Stat. 136 (1947).
79 The Landrum-Griffin Amendments, Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act, PUB.
L. No. 86-257, 73 Stat. 519 (1959).
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which outlaws "hot cargo" clauses,8' and an additional unfair labor practice,
8(b)(7), 82 which declares extended picketing for a recognitional or organiza-
tional objective to be an unfair labor practice.
In addition to the deterioration of workers' bargaining power, the
NLRB, Congress, and the courts "have taken what was initially conceived of as
the free market solution to market failures in individual bargaining and trans-
formed it into a less effective solution to these market failures. 8 3 Furthermore,
what is extremely unfortunate is that because of the broad language of the defi-
nition of supervisor, the Supreme Court has found many Board interpretations to
be unreasonable, given the plain language of the Act, and essentially removed
professional employees, 84 including attorneys and professors, from the Act's
protection,85 while also removing many employees that Congress likely never
intended to be considered supervisors from the protection of the Act. 86 Accord-
ingly, even though the Republican Party and union antagonists use the statistic
that union membership is down to 12% of the total non-agricultural workforce
nationwide and only 7.4% in the private sector,87 if one discounts all of the ex-
cluded employees, such as supervisors, unions currently "represent 20-25 per-
cent of the 'organizable' labor force."
88
If these examples of active deregulation of labor law by the courts, the
NLRB, and Congress were not enough, Congress and the courts have also elimi-
nated the ability of states to protect their citizens from large employers who, in
order to remain competitive, refuse to provide benefits to employees. 89 As the
80 National Labor Relations Act, §8(e) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 158(e) (2007)).
81 See generally HARPER, ESTREICHER & FLYNN, supra note 16, at 92.
82 National Labor Relations Act, §8(b)(7) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(7) (2007)).
83 Lofaso, supra note 34, at 58.
84 Id. at 58-59.
85 See NLRB v. Kentucky River Cmty. Care., Inc., 532 U.S. 706 (2001) (holding that because
charge nurses could assign lower level nurses to complete jobs within the hospital, the nurses
exercised supervisory authority within the meaning of Section 2(11), even though the nurses had
no authority to make tangible employment decisions); NLRB v. Yeshiva Univ., 444 U.S. 672
(1980) (holding that because the interests of professors at a university was necessarily that of the
university, such faculty members were supervisors and therefore excluded from NLRA coverage).
See also September Massacre, supra note 15, at 4-5 (discussing how both the Supreme Court and
the five-member National Labor Relations Board have narrowly construed the definition of an
employee under the NLRA in recent years).
86 Id.
87 See BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LAB., UNION MEMBERSHIP IN 2006, 1
(2007).
88 Symposium, New Ways of Governing the Workplace: Proceedings of the 2007 Meeting of
the Association of American Law Schools Section on Labor Relations and Employment Law, 11
EMPLOYEE RTS. & EMP. POL'Y J. 111, 118 (citing U.S. General Accounting Office, GAO-02-835,
Collective Bargaining Rights: Information on the Number of Workers with and Without Bargain-
ing Rights (2002)). [hereinafter New Ways].
89 Phil Fairbanks, Wal-Mart Lets Public Foot the Bill; Not Covering Health Care Allows Re-
tailer to Profit at Taxpayers' Expense, THE BUFFALO NEWS, June 4, 2007, at Al. (noting that one
[Vol. I111
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largest privately owned company in the world, the actions of the Wal-Mart Cor-
poration have a great deal of influence on both the United States and the
world.90 As Wal-Mart has strived to keep prices low and remain competitive, it
has done so by not providing the same benefits to its employees as its competi-
tors provide.91
Several states have either enacted or proposed laws to force Wal-Mart
and similarly-situated retailers to pay their employees' health care benefits to
combat the problem of Wal-Mart not providing health care benefits to its em-
ployees, 92 which caused both higher numbers of uninsured persons and em-
ployees' greater reliance on government programs such as Medicaid and Medi-
care.93 For example, the state of Maryland enacted the Fair Share for Health
Care Act, which taxed employers with ten-thousand or more workers, to provide
at least eight percent of their payroll for health coverage.94 Likewise, at the time
Maryland's Fair Share Health Care Act was passed, similar bills were emerging
in more than twenty states.95 Unfortunately, however, the Fourth Circuit Court
of Appeals struck down the Maryland legislature's work when it determined that
the Fair Share Health Care Act was in conflict with the Employee Income Secu-
rity Act ("ERISA"), which "pre-empts state laws that 'relate to any employee
benefit plan.' ' 96 The Fourth Circuit justified its decision on the premise that the
Maryland law violated a central purpose of the thirty-three year old ERISA stat-
ute-permitting "big companies to set up uniform health benefits across the
in ten Wal-Mart employees receives benefits from Medicaid, Medicare, the military, or other
state-funded health care programs funded by taxpayers).
90 See generally Meghan Brooke Phillips, Rescinding "Wal-Mart Law:" Examining Wal-
Mart's Compliance with Labor Law Abroad to Promote Not Only Fairer Competition for Wal-
Mart's Competitors, But Also Workers' Rights to Organize in Both the United States and Devel-
oping Nations (W. VA. L. REV., Working Paper); see also CNN, Fortune 500 2007: Wal-Mart
Stores, http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortune500/2007/snapshots/l1551.html (last vis-
ited Mar. 3, 2008); Telis Demos, The World's Largest Corporations, 156 FORTUNE MAGAZINE 2
(July 23, 2007).
91 ARINDRAJIT DUBE, DAVE GRAHAM-SQUIRE, KEN JACOBS & STEPHANIE LUCE, UC BERKELY
CTR. FOR LAB. AND EDUC., LIVING WAGE POLICIES AND WAL-MART: HOW A HIGHER WAGE
STANDARD WOULD IMPACT WAL-MART WORKERS AND SHOPPERS 2 (2007), available at
http://laborcenter.berkeley.edu/retaillwalmart-livingwage-policies07.pdf.
92 Danny Hakim, Michael Cooper & Jennifer Medina, Wal-Mart Looms Over 2 Bills to Im-
prove Worker Health Care, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8, 2006, at BI. [hereinafter, Hakim, Cooper &
Medina].
93 Id.
94 See generally Rebecca Entigar Nauta, ERISA Preempts Maryland's Fair Share Health Care
Fund Act: The Chilling Effect on State Innovation in Health Care Cost-Sharing with Big Business,
35 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 756 (2007).
95 Hakim, Cooper & Medina, supra note 92. For example, a bill in New Jersey sought to tax
employers with more than one-hundred employees "the equivalent of $3 an hour per worker
unless they provide coverage worth that much." Id.
96 Marie Gottschalk, Back to the Future? Health Benefits, Organized Labor, and Universal
Health Care, 32 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 923, 955 (2007).
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country, rather than navigat[ing] state-by-state requirements." 97 This decision
caused a screeching halt to the progressive efforts of state legislatures in early
January 2007.98
This active deregulation of labor law, which occurred through both
amending the NLRA and prohibiting state governments from aiding their citi-
zens with protective health care legislation, has aided in preventing employees
from obtaining the same benefits they once could through unionization. As I
will discuss in the next section, active deregulation is not the only reason that
the NLRA lacks the effectiveness that it had in the 1940s when it ensured work-
ers' rights to organize and enabled workers to control their working conditions.
Rather, passive deregulation, which results from congressional inaction in the
face of societal change, has permitted a massive alteration of the social and eco-
nomic landscape in the United States that has aided in deteriorating the Ameri-
can working class's economic position.99
B. A Static Act and Drastically Changed American Society Make Poor Bed
Fellows: How Passive Deregulation of Labor Law Has Aided in Making
the NLRA Less Effective
Although changes in the effectiveness of the NLRA have come about in
a number of ways other than through direct legislative deregulation, such as the
Taft-Hartley Act, most discussion regarding reforming the NLRA has focused
on the actions of unscrupulous employers and administrative inefficiencies.'00
Although these are relevant contributions to the current plight of American
workers seeking to unionize and improve their lot, government officials have
failed to consider the fact that an Act premised on the economic and social reali-
ties of the 1930s can no longer provide the same benefits to workers over sev-
enty years later.101
Success rates of unions from the enactment of the Wagner Act in 1935
until unionism's peak in the 1950s are partly attributable to the fact that em-
ployers did not suffer as great of a competitive advantage even if the firm organ-
ized. 102 Rather, during the 1950s, most, if not all, of the firm's competition was
governed by the same laws because the competition was located in the United
States. 0 3 Presently, however, "[t]he ability of unions to 'take wages out of
97 Michael Barbaro, Appeals Court Rules for Wal-Mart in Maryland Health Care Case, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 18, 2007, at C4.
98 Retail Industry Leaders Assoc. v. Fielder, 475 F.3d 180, 198 (4th Cir. 2007).
99 See generally Tucker, supra note 3.
100 See, e.g., Weiler, supra note 43 (Professor Weiler discusses the influx of unfair labor prac-
tices and administrative inefficiencies, but fails to adequately take into account the fact that the
world has changed drastically since the Wagner Act was instituted in 1935).
101 See generally Tucker, supra note 3.
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competition' has declined substantially thanks to the competitive forces
unleashed by the emergence of global markets . . . and technological change
altering needs for skilled labor and reducing the advantages of local produc-
ers."' °4 When free trade agreements unleashed global competitive forces and
governments deregulated "sectors of the economy, like interstate trucking and
airlines, unions [could] no longer" hope to have the same ability to take wages
out of competition. 0 5 Subsequently, in response to this competition, non-union
firms have made avoiding unionization a higher priority than in the pre-free-
trade era.1°6 Moreover, the growing competitive pressure in the age of global-
ization has made American employers rely more on "flexibilization strategies,
including outsourcing and the growth of contingent and precarious employ-
ment,107 all of which undermine the effectiveness of collective bargaining law
that was constructed on the norm of standard employment relation that offered
workers long-term, reasonably secure employment with a large employer."
10 8
As I will discuss more thoroughly later in this Note, much of the prob-
lems American workers face today result from Congress' failure to responsibly
enact measures to protect and provide for American workers who compete in a
global, rather than national, economy.' °9 This deregulation of the effectiveness
of the American labor market can be described as passive deregulation, or legis-
lative inaction "in the face of a rapidly changing labor market."'11 This Part of
the Note will focus on the various factors that have altered the Wagner Act's
effectiveness in providing the same benefits to American workers as it did in the
years directly after its enactment.
1. Unchanging with Changing Times: How Using the Same Struc-
ture of Complaint Resolution that Worked in the 1940s Has
Caused Great Inefficiency in the Twenty-First Century
According to former NLRB Chairman William B. Gould IV, "[c]ase
management, rapid processing, and the use of the one tool that the Board has at
its disposal for adequate law enforcement-section 10(j) of the National Labor
Relations Act-have always been a problem" at the NLRB.1' These problems
104 Id.
105 Tucker, supra note 3, at 140.
106 Id. "According to a study of union certification campaigns in 1998 and 1999, more than half
of the targeted employers threatened to move or shut-down operations in response to union activ-
ity." Id. at 140-41.
107 The 1947 Taft-Hartley Amendments removed individuals considered independent contrac-
tors from the coverage of the Act, see National Labor Relations Act, §2(3) (codified at 29 U.S.C.
§ 152(3) (2007)).
108 Tucker, supra note 3, at 141.
109 See discussion infra Part IH.A.2.
110 Id. at 110.
III Gould, supra note 8, at 477.
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are exacerbated by the fact that the Board still uses most of the same processes it
used in the 1940s and 1950s, despite an increase in both population and em-
ployers, which has caused a great deal of inefficiency when the Board reviews
cases. For example, Congress has not amended Section 3 of the Act" 2 in ap-
proximately fifty years. Section 3 of the NLRA sets the number of Board mem-
bers at five and requires three members to constitute a quorum."
3
Accordingly, the process of appointing Board members oftentimes
causes delays in selecting and confirming Board members, the appointment
process in and of itself causes delays because it creates vacancies that prevent
the Board from hearing a full case load." 4 In addition to these delays, because
Board orders are not self-enforcing and the parties that the Board finds to have
violated the Act do not have to comply with Board orders while they are appeal-
ing decisions, aggrieved employees are forced to wait longer to obtain relief for
the violation of their rights." 5
Unfair labor practice proceedings are processed in a very complicated
and time-consuming fashion. First, a claim is filed by an employee, union, or
employer and then it is reviewed by the Regional Officer." 6  Second, the Re-
gional Office must investigate the charge and decide whether or not to issue a
complaint."i7 If a complaint is not issued, then the charging party can appeal the
dismissal. 1 8 When the Regional Office issues a complaint, it is then presented
before an administrative law judge ("AU") who decides whether the accused
party has committed an unfair labor practice." 9 The ALJ, a neutral public ser-
vant, makes a decision that is not binding on the Board. 120 The case is then
brought before the Board, and the five-member Board determines whether the
accused party has committed an unfair labor practice.'12 When the Board issues
the decision, it is not self-enforcing.' 22 Rather, an aggrieved party must either
subsequently file exceptions to the Board's decision 2 3 or wait for the Board to
112 National Labor Relations Act, §3 of the (codified at 29 U.S.C. §153 (2007)).
113 Id.
114 Gould, supra note 8, at 477.
115 See generally National Labor Relations Act, §10(e) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) (2007)).
116 ROBERT A. GORMAN & MATTHEW W. FINKIN, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAW: UNIONIZATION






122 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) (2007) (stating the procedure the Board must use to have an order en-
forced by the Courts of Appeals).
123 National Labor Relations Act, §10(e) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 160(0 (2007)) (stating the
procedures for "any person aggrieved by a final order of the Board granting or denying in whole
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seek enforcement by one of the United States Courts of the Appeals. 2 4 When
the Court of Appeals issues its decision, the party charged with an unfair labor
practice can still seek review of the Court of Appeals' decision through a writ of
certiorari to the United States Supreme Court. 125 Likewise, the Board can ap-
peal the Court of Appeals' decision that denied the order for enforcement to the
United States Supreme Court. 126 During this entire process, even if the ALJ, the
five-member Board, and the Court of Appeals find that the charged party has
committed an unfair labor practice, the party does not have to comply with the
Board decision until the end of all processes and appeals.1
27
Based on the most comprehensive studies of delays in processing unfair
labor practice claims, which the authors unfortunately compiled with statistics
from the 1980s, the duration of the aforementioned process can exceed three
years.128 Accordingly, because of this complicated and extended review, en-
forcement, and compliance system, the Board has increasingly promoted volun-
tary settlements and mediations of disputes. According to General Counsel
Meisburg, "[t]the Agency's effectiveness and efficiency in administering the
Act is greatly enhanced by its ability to obtain voluntary resolution of unfair
labor practice cases that it has investigated and deemed worthy of prosecution,"
and
the Agency has achieved an excellent settlement record due to
the efforts of the staff and the cooperation of the Bar. In FY
2006, the Regions obtained 7,677 settlements of unfair labor
practice cases, representing a rate of 96.7% of total merit
cases, 129 compared to 8,232 settlements in FY 2005 and a rate
of 97.2%. Over the last 10 years the settlement rate has ranged
from between 91.5% and 99.5%.130
In the fiscal year 2006,13' 23,091 unfair labor practice charges were
filed by private persons, employers, or unions,132 and Regional Offices achieved




128 Weiler, supra note 43, at 1797.
129 Merit cases are unfair labor practice cases "in which a Regional Director achieves a settle-
ment, adjustment, or determines that formal proceedings are warranted." RONALD MEISBURG,




131 The 2006 fiscal year ran from October 1, 2005 until September 30, 2006. The statistics for
fiscal year 2006 are the most recent published statistics available from the NLRB. Id.
132 Id.
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a 96.7% settlement rate in all meritorious unfair labor practice cases. 33 The
NLRB Regional Offices used a median of ninety-three days to process cases
from the filing of charges to the issuance of complaints.' 34 But, this ninety-three
day period also included a fifteen day period "in which parties had the opportu-
nity to adjust charges and remedy violations without resorting to formal NLRB
processes."1
35
In situations where the parties did not come to a pre-complaint agree-
ment and the Regional Office deemed the complaints meritorious, the NLRB
issued 1,274 total complaints and subsequently scheduled these cases for hear-
ings. Thereafter, the AL's issued two-hundred and twenty-nine decisions for
the aforementioned cases. 136  Unfortunately, because of the Board's limited
resources and the delay caused by various factors, in fiscal year 2006, only
"about 4.5 percent of all meritorious charges and 51.1 percent of all cases in
which a hearing was conducted reached the Board for decision." 137 Further-
more, unfortunately both the number and the percentage of Board decisions
issued after an ALJ hearing will likely be much lower in fiscal year 2008, as
there are three vacancies on the five-member Board that have created a situation
where the remaining two Board members, one Democrat and one Republican,
can only issue decisions in cases in which they agree upon the result.
138
Furthermore, because the Board does not have self-enforcement powers,
when the parties to an action before the Board do not settle, the Board must hear
the case and subsequently file a petition for enforcement pursuant to Section
10(e) if it determines that the accused party has violated the Act. 39 Private per-
sons seeking review of Board orders can file a petition of review to a court of
appeals pursuant to Section 10(f),14° and in fiscal year 2006, private parties filed
petitions for review in sixty-nine of one-hundred and twenty-one cases, while
133 Id. at 1.
134 Id.
135 NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, SEVENTY-FIRST ANNUAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL




136 Id. at 2.
137 Id.
138 Posting of Jason Walta, Workplace Prof. Blog: A Member of the Law Professor Blogs Net-
work, The 2-0 Decisions Have Begun,
http://lawprofessors.typepad.comllaborprof blog/2008/01/the-2-0-nlrb-de.html (Jan. 25, 2008)
(last visited Nov. 4, 2008) (stating that the two remaining Board members, Members Liebman and
Schaumber, likely do not have the authority to issue decisions with only two members remaining
on the Board, and that this strategy will likely be tested in the court of appeals; moreover, because
there are only two current Board members, Liebman and Schaumber can only issue decisions
when they agree).
139 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) (2007).
140 29 U.S.C. § 160(0 (2007).
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the Regional Offices referred the remaining fifty-two cases for court enforce-
ment pursuant to Section 10(e) of the Act.1
4'
Consequently, these delays and informal settlements can cause employ-
ees whose employers have committed unfair labor practices against them to feel
compelled to settle their case because of the economic pressures incumbent
upon an employee, who an employer discharges for his or her union affiliation,
that cannot subsequently find substantially similar employment that would per-
mit the employee to provide sustenance for himself and his family. Moreover,
the aforementioned settlement procedures can also cause a war of attrition be-
tween unscrupulous employers who violate the employee's rights and the in-
jured employee because an employer must consent to any informal settlement of
the case. Accordingly, some settlements never occur because unscrupulous
employers
will be reluctant to settle a discriminatory discharge case if the
result will be reinstatement of a key union supporter during the
representation campaign. The prospect of long delay in prose-
cuting a formal charge increases the likelihood that the em-
ployer will be able to persuade the aggrieved employee to ac-
cept a cash payment and waive his right to reinstatement. When
the effects of procedural delay on the dynamics of settlement in
unfair labor practices are taken into account, the magnitude of
the problem is clear. Delay is the Achilles heel of the regula-
tory approach to the representation process under the NLRA.
142
It is obvious that certain changes to the current Board procedures could
serve as deterrents to unscrupulous employers, who can currently drag out pro-
ceedings for over three years, 143 even though the employer obviously committed
an unfair labor practice. Consequently, a congressional enactment that would
require parties to comply with the orders of the ALU, the Board, or a court of
appeals when litigation was pending, while permitting the Board to seek con-
tempt sanctions for such violations, by itself could be a great deterrent to such
unscrupulous practices by employers. However, instead of providing a more
efficient resolution process, Congress has deregulated the original power of the
NLRA through its failure to amend the Act to provide for a more efficient dis-
pute resolution process, even though the unscrupulous employer's incentive to
play hardball and extend proceedings should be obvious to Congress.
141 MEISBURG, supra note 129, at 7.
142 Weiler, supra note 43, at 1797.
143 MEISBURG, supra note 129, at 184, tbl. 23 (the median age of cases from the filing of a
charge was 1517 days in the fiscal year 2006).
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2. Preventing Workers from Taking "Wages Out of the Competi-
tion":144 The Impact of Globalization and Outsourcing
One major goal for both American workers and businesses today is re-
maining competitive in a world of global trade. 145 "Capital and labor have both
become so mobile that national borders seem as meaningful as the moat around
a sand castle in the face of a rising tide."' 46 While outsourcing147 may seem like
a relatively new phenomenon, off-shoring, 148 or relocation within the United
States is not a new phenomenon in the United States. "Historically, firms fo-
cused mostly on domestic or nearby international expansion. Manufacturing
activity, for example, slowly migrated from the northeastern United States to the
South and Southwest to take advantage of nonunionized [sic] labor and tax
benefits."'
149
Employees in the United States are no longer primarily working in
manufacturing based industries as they did when Congress enacted the Wagner
Act in 1935. For instance, based on the data collected from the Bureau of Labor
Statistics in December 2007, only 10.1% of the American workforce was em-
ployed in the manufacturing industry, while 84.0% of workers were employed
in service-providing industries. 50 Consequently, because the economy of the
United States is no longer as industrial- or manufacturing-based as it was at the
time of the enactment of the NLRA in 1935, outsourcing has become a major
issue for American workers, businesses, and the economy alike. However, even
in the manufacturing industries, which employ over fifteen million Americans
and produce over three-fourths of the value of manufactured goods purchased in
the United States, nearly fourteen million of those workers are not unionized,
14' Estreicher, supra note 45, at 13.
145 David Koeppel, Tech Workers Struggle To Answer Overseas Threat, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 23,
2003, §10 (Job Market), at 1.
146 Dean Hubbard, Reimaging Workers' Human Rights: Transformative Organizing for a So-
cially Aware Global Economy, 5 HASTINGS RACE & POVERTY L.J. 1, 17 (2008).
147 "Outsourcing occurs when a company... turns over responsibility, in whole or in part, for
an internal business function to an outside supplier.... The supplier will often, but not always,
purchase the assets, license the software, and/or hire the people that the customer is using to per-
form the function." Brad Peterson, When and Why Companies Outsource and Offshore,
PRACTICING L. INsTrruTE 13, 15 (2007) (Westlaw, Practicing Law Institute Database).
148 "Off-shoring" occurs when "a company changes from having work performed by people in
a high-wage country, to having work performed by people in a low-wage country. The movement
of work is called 'offshoring' regardless of whose employees perform the work." Id. at 18-19.
149 George S. Geis, Business Outsourcing and the Agency Cost Problem, 82 NOTRE DAME L.
REv. 955, 963 (2007).
150 UNrrED STATES DEP'T OF LAB., BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS NEWS FOR DECEMBER 2007,
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which is likely caused not only by increased competition demands, but also
caused by both globalization and weak federal labor laws with no teeth.151
Increased competition is more detrimental to some service-based indus-
tries, including customer service and other technology-based jobs that can be
readily outsourced,5 2 than it is in manufacturing industries. 53 Unfortunately,
Congress has yet to update federal laws, specifically the NLRA, in a fashion that
takes these economic realities into consideration. Consequently, this failure to
enact meaningful reforms could have drastic consequences for American busi-
nesses, workers, and the economy, as the total size of the off-shore services
market is currently "estimated at $12.2 billion for India, $8.6 billion for Ireland,
and $3.4 billion for China," and these figures are expected to total "$110 billion
by 2010. " 154 Experts also estimate that by the end of 2008, "an estimated 4.1
million jobs in the service sector will have moved from developed economies to
places like China, India, Russia, Brazil, and the Philippines."'' 55 Unfortunately
these statistics represent a small proportion of the jobs that firms could theoreti-
cally outsource, as the McKinsey Global Institute estimates that nearly one-
hundred and sixty million jobs in the service economy, constituting approxi-
mately eleven percent of total employment, "could be performed anywhere in
the world."156 Thankfully, however, while the authors of the McKinsey study
do expect the size of the outsourcing and off-shoring market to grow rapidly, the
authors do not expect firms to outsource more than 2.5% of this one-hundred
and sixty million figure because of a wide variety of industrial, organizational,
regulatory, and social factors that will limit the number of jobs transferred out of
developing countries.
157
151 New Ways, supra note 88.
152 Koeppel, supra note 145.
153 See, e.g., Mario F. Bognanno, Michael P. Keane & Donghoon Yang, The Influence of
Wages and Industrial Relations Environments on the Production Location Decisions of U.S. Mul-
tinational Corporations, 58 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REv. 171 (2005). Bognanno, Keane, and Yang's
study used the Benchmark and Annual Surveys of the U.S. Direct Investment Abroad collected by
the Bureau of Economic Analysis to examine the operations of multinational corporations
(MNC's) in seven manufacturing industries and twenty-two countries over the years 1982-1991.
This study assessed how tariffs, wages, and the industrial relations environment were statistically
significant determinants of the extent to which MNC's located operations in a particular host
country. The researchers found that while tariffs, wages, and the industrial relations environment
were statistically significant determinants of the extent to which MNC's located operations in a
particular host country, the impact of these factors was much smaller than that of the host coun-
try's size. Moreover, the study also found no evidence that tariff reductions increased the share of
U.S. MNC activities located abroad. Although this study is less useful in assessing the effects of
globalization post-NAFTA, because all data collected in this study was pre-NAFTA, this study
seems to still be relevant to the discussion of competition in manufacturing industries today. Id.
at 171.
154 Geis, supra note 149, at 964.
156 Id. at 957.
156 Id. at 957-58.
157 Id. at 958.
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The outsourcing phenomenon is generally explained as the result of the
lowering of "[r]elatively high transaction costs that have historically prevented
firms from tapping into the global supply of labor." 158 When these transaction
costs dropped, through improvements in factors such as communication, digi-
talization, standardization, and the like, it became "economical for firms to em-
brace overseas production. In essence, falling interaction costs have unlocked a
massive supply of labor, driving down the price of economic inputs, realigning
business processes and tempting (or forcing managers) to move production out-
side of the finn."' 159 Furthermore, although the outsourcing and off-shoring phe-
nomenon has most affected jobs in customer call centers, information technol-
ogy services and back-office support, other service jobs are not immune from
this phenomenon. 160 For example, overseas analysts are processing sophisti-
cated derivative contracts for Wall Street, overseas doctors interpret CAT scans
and x-rays for hospitals, and individuals with PhD's in molecular biology are
discovering new drugs for pharmaceutical firms.
16 1
Accordingly, it is evident that under current law, the NLRA can no
longer have the same effect it was permitted to have when the Wagner Act was
passed in 1935-that of placing money in the hands of working Americans so
that the American economy would prosper. 162 Although, as discussed supra,
certain services, including medical and legal services, cannot be outsourced,
many American jobs are currently at risk because of outsourcing. Furthermore,
because American workers compete globally with countries that have much
lower labor standards, the NLRA can no longer promise the same benefits and
negotiation powers as it did in the 1940s. As will be discussed in the next sub-
section, because of the current health care crisis, employees not only have to
fear job instability, but also have to fear the prospect of having neither health
insurance nor sufficient income to provide for themselves and their families in
the future.
3. The Aging of America and the Health Care Crisis
Because of better health care and modem technology, Americans are
living much longer today than they did in the 1930s and 1940s., 63 Accordingly,
if the government were to index the age when modem workers are able to draw
Social Security to a modern worker's longevity, today's workers would have to
wait until age seventy-three, rather than age sixty-five, to receive benefits.' 
64
158 Id. at 960, n.5.
159 Id. at 961.
160 Id.
161 Id. at 964.
162 See supra notes 23-33.
163 See Trumble & Bigdely, supra note 42.
164 Id at 2.
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Consequently, the current Social Security system is destined for failure because
much-needed reform has never materialized. Additionally, essentially everyone
has come to realize that the Social Security program is unlikely to provide bene-
fits for the majority of the current work force when they retire.
165
Unfortunately for current workers, "companies also find it easier to
eliminate future benefits" of current employees because in some cases their ex-
isting retirees and active employees may take the company to court for breach of
contract. 166 Moreover, these firms' commitments to paying future retiree bene-
fits prevent current workers from reaping the benefit of their work, as many
companies have committed themselves to paying retired workers up to seventy-
five percent of their former salaries, which could theoretically continue for
twenty or more years because the average person is living much longer than
people used to live. 167 Furthermore, companies are finding it increasingly more
difficult to even provide these benefits because although three hundred and
forty-three of the top five hundred U.S. companies offer defined pension bene-
fits to their workers, nearly ninety percent of these pension plans are in the red,
while only thirty-five plans either show a surplus or break even.168 In response
to this problem, government agencies, such as the Equal Opportunity in Em-
ployment Commission ("EEOC"), the agency granted authority to enforce pro-
visions of various federal acts, including the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act ("ADEA"), have responded by placing a greater strain on current govern-
ment benefit programs such as Medicare.169 For example, in late December
2007, the EEOC announced a new rule that permitted employers to reduce or
eliminate health care benefits for retirees when they turned sixty-five and be-
came eligible for Medicare, without subjecting the employer to liability under
the ADEA. 170 These statistics are very disheartening for the majority of the
American workforce that is struggling to make ends meet. Even more troubling
is the fact that many Americans have absolutely no form of health insurance
coverage. In 2006 "the number of uninsured Americans increased by a daunting
2.2 million, from 44.8 million in 2005 to 47.0 million in 2006. ' '171 The most
cited reason for this increase in the number of uninsured Americans is that em-
ployment-based coverage continued to deteriorate, as "the number of full-time
workers without health insurance rose from 20.8 million in 2005 to 22.0 million
165 Id.
166 Id. at 3.
167 Id.
168 Id.
169 Robert Pear, U.S. Ruling Backs Benefit Cut at 65 in Retiree Plans, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 27,
2007, at Al.
170 Id.
171 Editorial, Bleak Findings on Health Insurance, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 29, 2007, at A22 [herein-
after referred to as Bleak Findings].
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in 2006, presumably because either the employers or the workers or both found
it too costly.'
172
Another troubling statistic is that although fifty-nine percent of small
businesses currently provide some kind of health insurance, the individuals who
conducted this survey included employers who have cut benefits and shifted
more costs to their employees through high deductible plans, bare-bones cover-
age, preventive care plans, and health reimbursement plans in this figure.
73
Moreover, these small business employees represent "one of the fastest-growing
segments of the nation's 44 million uninsured; [and] they now represent at least
20 percent of the total, according to federal census data."'' 74 A substantial factor
in small businesses' inability to provide their employees with health care bene-
fits is the fact that in most states, neither legislatures nor the state insurance
commissioner have enacted statutes or regulations that fix a maximum rate that
insurance companies cannot exceed when they set the group rates for these
small business after the illness of one of the small business's employees. 75 In
addition, health care premiums continue to rise, (rising eighty-seven percent
between the years 2000 and 2006), while the percentage of workers covered by
employer health care plans declined by three percentage points during the same
period. 176 Furthermore, those employees still covered by employer health care
plans are receiving coverage for increasingly higher costs. For example, em-
ployees in the Northeast paid an average of $1,499 for such benefits in 2001,
compared to $2,765 in 2006.'7
Because Congress has failed to properly address the current health care
crisis, workers face rapidly increasing health care costs in the face of steady or
declining wages and benefits, which have created devastating consequences for
many American families.178 For example, individuals, rather than employers,
172 Id.
173 Fran Hawthorne, To Keep Health Plans, Many Firms Shift Costs, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26,
2007, at H7.
174 Milt Freudenheim, When Even One Illness Can Push Insurance Costs Up, N.Y. TIMES, May
5, 2007, at C 1.
175 Id. Nine states, including Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, and Maryland prohibit in-
surers from considering the health status of workers when insurers set rates for small groups.
Moreover, a number of states limit the size of yearly rate increases. For example, California gen-
erally does not permit rates to rise over ten percent. However, many states that provide any sort of
regulation have provided very high maximum rate increases that can still burden small businesses
seeking to provide benefits for their employees. For example, Kansas permits increases of
twenty-five percent, Ohio permits forty-percent raises, and Arizona permits increases of sixty-
percent or more, while some states such as Pennsylvania, Virginia, Hawaii, and the District of
Columbia have no ceilings for yearly rate increases. Because most insurance law, except that pre-
empted by ERISA, is regulated by individual states, changes in rate regulation statutes would have
to occur at the state rather than national level. Id.
176 Bob Tedeschi, Other Reasons Borrowers Faulter, N.Y. TIMEs, May 6, 2007, § 11, at 13.
177 Id.
178 Gottschalk, supra note 96, at 949.
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still pay the highest percentage of health care costs. 17 9 Furthermore, employers
are only the third largest contributor of payments for health care coverage, pro-
viding only twenty-seven percent of health care payments, while the govern-
ment shoulders thirty-six percent of the bill, and individuals pay thirty-three
percent of costs. 80 Consequently, the burden on individuals is de-emphasized,
even though individuals are truly paying more for rising health care costs, "be-
cause 'individuals ultimately bear the responsibility of paying for health care
through taxes, reduced earnings, and higher product costs.""
8 1
Although health care is undoubtedly expensive by itself, the actual cost
of providing health care is not as high as one would think. 82  Currently,
"[a]dministrative costs for employers, insurers, and health care providers com-
prise at least one-quarter of total spending on health care in the United
States."' 183 Experts theorize that administrative costs are much higher in the
United States than in other countries because the United States relies "on a
complex, fragmented, for-profit health insurance industry with high marketing
and overhead costs. ' 184  These same experts also theorize that streamlining
health care administrative costs in the United States "to levels comparable to
those of Canada would reduce the U.S. health tab by an estimated 17 per-
cent."
,185
Unfortunately, these rising health care costs have not only affected the
physical well-being of the American workforce, but also affected the quality of
life for many Americans. For example, in the year 2006, job losses and cuts
caused thirty-six percent of mortgage delinquencies, while health care costs and
illness and too much personal debt, including increasing health care premiums,
accounted for twenty-one percent and fourteen percent of foreclosures and de-
linquencies, respectively. 
86
Because Congress has not kept pace with the changing times, societal
realities no longer permit workers to receive the benefits from their employers,
who are undoubtedly competing to be profitable in a global and largely free-
market economy. This failure to enact laws to prevent multi-national corpora-
tions from abusing other countries' workforces to achieve maximum profits and




182 Jeffrey Kelley, Universal Broadband, RiCHMOND TIMES DISPATCH, July 9, 2007, at Al
(indicating that if universal broadband were used then not only could medical administrative costs
be less expensive, but also it could save lives "by allowing health-care providers to rapidly ex-
change medical records over long distances.")
183 Gottschalk, supra note 96, at 949-50.
184 Id.
185 Id. at 950.
186 Bob Tedeschi, supra note 176.
187 See generally Phillips, supra note 90.
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ingly, as one can clearly see from the landscape described above, Congress has
erred in focusing its efforts on reforming the NLRA. Although the NLRA has
inefficiencies that Congress can definitely ameliorate by granting the five-
member NLRB stronger remedial powers so that it can more effectively deter
unlawful activities, the NLRA can no longer serve the same purpose that it
served during the 1940s. Furthermore, although updating and altering the
NLRA to make it current with changing needs and times will likely benefit
workers, it is just a small step in the social change that must take place for both
American workers and businesses to prosper. In the following section, I will
incorporate my analysis of the above-mentioned realities into my assessment of
the EFCA. As will become evident in this analysis, because of both passive and
active deregulation of American labor law, the EFCA is the improper mecha-
nism for meeting the needs of American workers.
IV. THE PROPOSALS AND POTENTIAL OUTCOMES OF ENACTING THE
EMPLOYEE FREE CHOICE ACT
On March 1, 2007, the United States House of Representatives for the
110th Congress approved the EFCA by a vote of 241 to 185.188 However, on
June 26th, Senate Republicans were successful in blocking the consideration of
the bill through the use of a filibuster, as the bill's supporters were only able to
obtain fifty-one of the required sixty votes needed to end filibuster through the
use of cloture.189 Although the EFCA was not enacted in 2007, it still provides
an excellent framework for analyzing the direction that both the union leaders
and the predominately Democratic Party-affiliated proponents of the bill be-
lieved should be taken not only to remedy the inefficiencies at the NLRB, but
also to remedy the plight of the American worker. Additionally, the introduc-
tion of the EFCA in 2007 was somewhat of a political "litmus test,"' 90 with both
big business and organized labor not only spending heavily to influence votes
on the EFCA, but also recording votes made in both chambers of Congress to
determine what candidates would receive campaign dollars in the 2008 elec-
tions.191
In the sections that follow, I will examine the various provisions of the
Act and offer my personal opinions on the potential effects and benefits of those
provisions. In Part IV.B., infra, I will discuss these provisions in tandem with
effects of both the active and passive deregulation of American labor law to
explain why the EFCA is ill-suited to remedy the plight of the American
188 Newman & Crase, supra note 1, at 14.
189 153 CONG. REC. D. 901, 110th Cong. (lst Sess. 2007).
190 PR Newswire Association, LLC, EmployerReport.com: Five Simple Questions for Congress
on the Employee Free Choice Act, Feb. 7, 2007, available at LexisNexis All News Database (re-
ferring to the EFCA as a "litmus test").
191 Jeanne Cummings, Politics & Economics: Business Seeks to Defeat Bill on Unions, WALL
ST. J., Feb. 14, 2007, at A13.
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worker. In Part V, infra, I will suggest starting points for reforming American
labor law in a way that will truly aid the American worker, American busi-
nesses, and the American economy.
A. Provisions of the Employee Free Choice Act
As it was introduced into the House of Representatives in January of
2007, the EFCA would have amended sections 9(c), 3(b),' 92 8(b), 10(c), 193 10(1),
10(m), 194 and 12, and add subsection h to Section 8, to achieve the purpose of
enabling "employees to form, join, or assist labor organizations, [and] to pro-
192 H.R. 800, 110th Cong. (1st Sess. 2007) would have amended Section 3(b) of the National
Labor Relations Act, codified at 29 U.S.C. § 153(b), to read:
The Board is authorized to delegate to any group of three or more members
any or all of the powers which it may itself exercise. The Board is also au-
thorized to delegate to its regional directors its powers under section 9 to de-
termine the unit appropriate for the purpose of collective bargaining, to inves-
tigate and provide for hearings, and determine whether a question of represen-
tation exists to direct an election or take a secret ballot under subsection (c) or
(e) of section 9, and to issue certifications as provided for in that section.
(Emphasis added to current Section to indicate the language of the proposed amendments).
193 Id. If Congress had passed the Employee Free Choice Act, it would have made Section
10(c) state:
The testimony taken by such member, agent, or agency or the Board shall be
reduced to writing and filed with the Board. Thereafter, in its discretion, the
Board upon notice may take further testimony or hear argument. If upon the
preponderance of the testimony taken the Board shall be of the opinion that
any person named in the complaint has engaged in or is engaging in any such
unfair labor practice, then the Board shall state its findings of fact and shall is-
sue and cause to be served on such person an order requiring such person to
cease and desist from such unfair labor practice, and to take such affirmative
action including reinstatement of employees with or without back pay, as will
effectuate the policies of this Act; Provided, That where an order directs rein-
statement of an employer, back pay may be required of the employer or labor
organization, as the case may be, responsible for the discrimination suffered
by him: Provided further, That if the Board finds that an employer has dis-
criminated against an employee in violation of subsection (a)(3) of section 8
while employees of the employer were seeking representation by a labor or-
ganization, or during the period after a labor organization was recognized
and as a representative defined in subsection (a) of section 9 until the first
collective bargaining contract was entered into between the employer and the
representative, the Board in such order shall award the employee back pay,
and in addition, 2 times that amount as liquidated damages....
(Emphasis added to indicate the text of the proposed amendment).
194 H.R. 800, 110th Cong. (1st Sess. 2007) would have amended Section 10(m) of the National
Labor Relations Act, codified at 29 U.S.C. § 160(m), by inserting the words "under circumstances
not subject to 10(1)" after "section 8."
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vide for mandatory injunctions for unfair labor practices during organizing ef-
forts.'
195
First, the proposed amendments to 9(c), 196 if enacted, would require the
certification of a labor organization as the majority representative for a group of
employees on the basis of a card check. Next, the proposed addition to section
8, would have added another provision to Section 8, subsection (h). 197 Section
195 H.R. 800, 110th Cong. (1st Sess. 2007) (stating the purpose of the Employee Free Choice
Act).
196 H.R. 800, 110th Cong. (1st Sess. 2007) would have amended Section 9(c) of the National
Labor Relations Act by adding the following language to the Section:
(6) Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, whenever a petition
shall have been filed by an employee or group of employees or any individual
or labor organization acting in their behalf alleging that a majority of employ-
ees in a unit appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining wish to be
represented by an individual or labor organization for such purposes, the
Board shall investigate the petition. If the Board finds that a majority of the
employees in a unit appropriate for bargaining has signed valid authorizations
designating the individual or labor organization specified in the petition as
their bargaining representative and that no other individual or labor organiza-
tion is currently certified or recognized as the exclusive representative of any
of the employees in the unit, the Board shall not direct an election but shall
certify the individual or labor organization as the representative described in
subsection (a).
(7) The Board shall develop guidelines and procedures for the designation of
employees of a bargaining representative in the manner prescribed in para-
graph (6). Such guidelines and procedures shall include-
(A) model collective bargaining authorization language that may be used for
purposes of making the designations described in paragraph (6); and
(B) procedures to be used by the Board to establish the validity of signed au-
thorizations designating bargaining representatives."
197 H.R. 800, 110th Cong. (1st Sess. 2007), if enacted, would have added proposed subsection
(h) to Section 8 of the Act, codified at 29 U.S.C. §158, and would have read:
(h) Whenever collective bargaining is for the purpose of establishing an initial
agreement following certification or recognition, the provisions of subsection
(d) shall be modified as follows:
(1) No later than 10 days after receiving a written request for collective bar-
gaining from an individual or labor organization that has been newly organ-
ized or certified as a representative as defined in Section 9(a), or within such
further period as the parties agree upon, the parties shall meet and commence
to bargain collectively and shall make every reasonable effort to conclude and
sign a collective bargaining agreement.
(2) If after the expiration of the 90-day period beginning on the date on which
bargaining is commenced, or such additional period as the parties may agree
upon, the parties have failed to reach an agreement, either party may notify
the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service of the existence of a dispute
and request mediation. Whenever such a request is received, it shall be the
duty of the Service promptly to put itself in communication with the parties
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8(h) (1) would require that an employer meet and confer with the newly certi-
fied union within ten days of the union making such a request. Moreover, the
addition of subsection (2) to section 8(h) would have permitted either party to
contact the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service ("FMCS") to request
mediation of the dispute, if the parties did not come to an agreement within 90
days, or any such additional period that the parties may agree upon. 9 If the
parties did not come to an agreement after the FMCS began mediation, subsec-
tion (3) of Section 8(h) would have required that the FMCS refer' 99 the dispute
to an arbitration board, which would render a decision settling the dispute that
would be "binding upon the parties for a period of two years, unless amended
during such period by written consent of the parties.
Third, the amendments to Section 12201 of the Act, would have added
civil penalties, therefore providing additional remedies to the traditional make-
whole remedies of the Act, by providing treble back pay for employees dis-
criminated against in violation of section 8(a)(3).2°2 Additionally, Section
10(1)203 would have required the Board to seek injunctions when it believed
(3) If after the expiration of the 30-day period beginning on the date on which
the request for mediation is made under paragraph (2), or such additional pe-
riod as the parties may agree upon, the Service is not able to bring the parties
to agreement by conciliation, the Service shall refer the dispute to an arbitra-
tion board established in accordance with such regulations as may be pre-
scribed by the Service. The arbitration panel shall render a decision settling
the dispute and such decision shall be binding upon the parties for a period of




201 See H.R. 800, 110th Cong. (1st Sess. 2007).
202 See supra note 193.
203 H.R. 800, 110th Cong. (1st Sess. 2007) if enacted, would have made Section 10(1) read:
(1) (1) Whenever it is charged-
(A) that any employer-
(i) discharged or otherwise discriminated against an employee in violation of
subsection (a)(3) of section 8;
(ii) threatened to discharge or to otherwise discriminate against an employee
in violation of subsection (a)(1) of Section 8; or
(iii) engaged in any other unfair labor practice within the meaning of subsec-
tion (a)(1) that significantly interferes with, restrains, or coerces employees in
the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section 7; while employees of that
employer were seeking representation by a labor organization or during the
period after a labor organization was recognized as a representative defined in
section 9(a) until the first collective bargaining contract is entered into be-
tween the employer and the representative; or
(B) that any person has engaged in an unfair labor practice within the mean-
ing of subparagraph (A), (B) or (C) of section 8(b)(4), section 8(e), or section
8(b)(7); the preliminary investigation of such charge shall be made forthwith
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there were meritorious charges under sections 8(a)(1), 8(a)(3), 8(b)(4)(A)-(C),
8(e), or 8(b)(7) of the Act,204 in addition to the injunctions already required un-
der the current subsection (m) when employees engage in certain strikes; while,
the EFCA would have amended subsection (in) to conform with the amend-
ments in subsection (1).2 05 Fourth, the amendments to Section 12 of the Act,
would have enabled the Board to sanction employers with civil fines up to
$20,000 for each violation of Sections 8(a)(1) and (a)(3), with the Board being
directed to assess such fines depending on the gravity of the aforesaid viola-
206tion. Finally, the EFCA would have amended subsection (7) of Section
8(b),207 to conform with the amendments made to Section 9.208
B. Imagining the Possibilities: The Potential Effects of the Employee Free
Choice Act
The EFCA can essentially be divided into three parts-() the card
check provision, (2) the remedies provision, and (3) the mediation and arbitra-
tion provision. In this subsection, I will discuss each of these three major cate-
gories of provisions, based on the statutory language in the EFCA that was in-
troduced into Congress in 2007. I will also discuss the potential effects of such
provisions, given the current labor law landscape, and offer my opinions on the
provisions. In general, I believe that these provisions would only increase the
number of employees in unions for a time because passive and active deregula-
tion of labor law209 would inhibit the effects that EFCA proponents have
claimed would occur if Congress passed the EFCA.210 For example, many poli-
ticians have hailed the EFCA as the solution to problems of the middle class and
some politicians have made the outlandish claim that this Act will mean better
and given priority over all other cases except cases of like character in the of-
fice where it is filed or to which it is referred. (Emphasis added to indicate
amendments that would result if the EFCA were enacted).
204 Id.
205 See supra note 194.
206 See supra note 201.
207 H.R. 800, 1 10th Cong. (1st Sess. 2007) would have amended Section 8(b)(7), 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(b)(7), by:
(A) in paragraph (7)(B) by striking ", or" and inserting "or a petition has been filed under section
9(c)(6), or"; and (B) in paragraph (7)(C) by striking "when such a petition has been filed" and
inserting "when such a petition other than a petition under 9(c)(6) has been filed."
208 Id.
209 See discussion supra Part III.
210 Press Release, Office of California Rep. George Miller, Education and Labor Committee
Approves Employee Free Choice Act: Legislation Would Strengthen America's Middle Class by
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health care for workers. 211 However, as will be discussed in this section, be-
cause of the ambiguous language in the EFCA and the passive and active de-
regulation of labor law, generally, the EFCA is ill-suited to remedy the plight of
American workers. Simply put, given the current economic realities caused by
globalization, outsourcing, and the health care crisis, "[u]nion representation is
not always the right choice for workers; if it were, the law would simply man-
date a union for every plant.
' 212
1. Removing Secret Ballot Elections and Requiring Union Certifi-
cation Based on a Card Check
Scholars, political leaders, and union leaders have been advocating re-
quired certification of unions based on a showing of majority support through a
card check for numerous years.213 A card check system is a mechanism fre-
quently utilized by union organizers in Canada, whereby workers simply sign a
union authorization card and the Labor Board subsequently certifies the union as
the majority bargaining representative if it verifies that a majority of workers
within the bargaining unit have signed the authorization cards.2t 4 Most of the
215card check proponents, advocating a system similar to that in Canada, view
the card check system as the only way of permitting employee free choice.
Meanwhile, unscrupulous employers who commit unfair labor practices have
realized that because of the delay and the lack of deterrent sanctions available to
the Board, they can prevent unionization or delay elections for over a year or
more. These delays and the advent of employer committed unfair labor prac-
tices result in nominal relief for employees, and oftentimes have a profound
impact on the minds of employee voters who had previously wanted union rep-
216resentation.
However, as I will discuss in this section, requiring union certification
on a card check is simply the duct tape intended to repair the overriding health
care reform and global competition problems. Moreover, because it could po-
211 Press Release, Iowa Democratic Party, Harkin: Employee Free Choice Act Can Boost Io-
wans' Health Insurance, Pension Benefits (Apr. 30, 2007), available at
http://www.orchidforchange.com/ia/ht/display/ReleaseDetails/i/1024131/pid/315102. [hereinafter
Harkin].
212 Estreicher, supra note 45, at 32.
213 See generally Sheila Murphy, Comment, A Comparison of the Selection of Bargaining
Representatives in the United States and Canada: Linden Lumber, Gissel, and the Right to Chal-
lenge Majority Status, 10 COMP. LAB. L.J. 65, 81-96 (1988) (advocating the Canadian model,
which utilizes authorization cards to show majority support, as a suitable alternative to the system
of selecting a bargaining representative currently used in the United States).
214 Id. at 81-82.
215 See generally id. at 81-96 (discussing the Canadian elections system); H.W. Arthurs, Can-
ada: National Traditions in Labor Law Scholarship: The Canadian Case, 23 COMP. LAB. L. &
POL'Y J. 645 (2002) (outlining the Canadian labor law scholarship traditions).
216 See generally Weiler supra note 43, at 1787-99.
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tentially place employees in a very difficult and precarious situation, the card
check could potentially inhibit employee free choice in voting in much the same
way that unscrupulous employers currently act to deter unionization at their
firms. Additionally, because employees need to hear both sides of the story
during an election, and because the union and employer can utilize alternative
mechanisms such as voluntary card check agreements and neutrality agree-
ments, a card check would be an imperfect solution to effectuating employee
free choice. In addition, the mediation and arbitration provisions in the EFCA
could cause employees to be locked into an agreement because they authorized
the union to represent them in a card check,a1 7 rather than permitting workers to
hear the potential realities that could result from approving a union. Further-
more, instead of effectuating employee free choice and enabling workers to be
in a better position as the result of authorizing the union to represent them for
collective bargaining purposes, enacting the EFCA would likely result in higher
union numbers for a time, but not improve the overall condition of workers.
Consequently, because of both passive and active deregulation of labor law,
such an overhaul of the NLRA, as evidenced in the EFCA, would do little to
improve American workers' standards of living.21 8 Finally, stronger remedial
powers could curb the occurrences of unfair labor practices enough to not only
allow more elections to run without the occurrence of unfair labor practices, but
also to provide for more efficiency at the Board by deterring unfair labor prac-
tices from occurring.219
Harvard Law Professor Paul C. Weiler has described "the elaborate
formal procedure" for representation cases as follows:
In order to make a sufficient showing of interest for a certifica-
tion application to the NLRB, a trade union must convince at
least 30% of the employees in a unit to sign membership or au-
thorization cards. The Board investigates the union's petition,
defines the scope of the appropriate bargaining unit, decides
whether the conditions for a valid election have been satisfied,
and, if they have, conducts a secret ballot vote among the eligi-
ble employees. Before the election, both union and employer
vigorously campaign in an effort to influence the vote; an ex-
tensive battery of legal regulations is aimed at preventing any
improper inference with the employees' choices. Assuming
that its "laboratory conditions" for an informed and unrestrained
verdict have been satisfied, the Board will either certify the vic-
torious union as the exclusive bargaining representative for the
employees (and impose on the employer a corresponding duty
217 See discussion infra Part 1V.B.3.
218 See discussion supra Part ILA-B.
219 See discussion supra Part 1Y.B.2.
[Vol. I I11
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to bargain), or, if the union has lost, bar any further elections in
the unit for at least twelve months.22°
Even under the current Act, there is no requirement that the union must
be certified by a secret-ballot election.22' Instead, the Board has promulgated
regulations for such elections and has referred to these elections as the "pre-
ferred route" of determining a union's majority status.222 New York University
Law Professor Samuel Estreicher has aptly described the Board's reasoning in
preferring and requiring elections. In response to the arguments presented by
proponents of the card check system, Professor Estreicher has stated:
NLRB policy over the decades has recognized that employees
often sign cards (even when properly worded) under the mis-
taken impression that they are merely authorizing an election or
simply to avoid a personal encounter with the union organizer.
Moreover, the conversation between the employee and the un-
ion organizer is understandably one-sided; the arguments
against union representation and collective bargaining are not
presented.223
In fiscal year 2006, the Regional Offices conducted 2,296 initial elec-
tions, 91.1% of which "were held pursuant to agreement of the parties, com-
pared to 2,715 initial elections and an 89.0% election agreement rate for
' 224
fiscal year 2005. Moreover, in fiscal year "2006 the median time to proceed to
an election from the filing of a petition was 38 days ... [and] 94.2% of all initial
representation cases were conducted within the 56 days of the filing of the peti-
tion. 225 In contested election cases, "Regional Directors issued 214 decisions
in contested representation cases after hearing in a median of 36 days from the
filing of the petition. 226 Overall, "[u]nions won 1195 representation elections,
or 55.7 percent., 227 Although these election results indicate that some employ-
ees changed their minds before the election, such results are explained not only
by the influx of employer unfair labor practices that chill the free choice of em-
220 Weiler, supra note 43, at 1775.
221 The plain language of Section 9 of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 159(a), states: "Representatives
designated or selected for the purpose of collective bargaining by the majority of the employees in
a unit appropriate for such purposes, shall be the exclusive representatives of all employees in
such unit for the purposes of collective bargaining ... " 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (2007).
222 NLRB v. Gissel Packing, Co., 395 U.S. 575, 596 (1969).
223 Estreicher, supra note 45, at 31-32.
224 MEISBURG, supra note 129, at 7.
225 Id.
226 Id.
227 Id. at 16.
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ployees,228 but also by the fact that many employees may have signed the cards
under pressure from union-supporting employees and subsequently changed
their minds about whether union representation was best after hearing the em-
ployer's side of the story.
229
Like Professor Estreicher ° I believe that the card check system is not
likely to always be the best indicator of employees' desires to have a union.
Moreover, because the current language of the EFCA, which grants authority to
231the Board to develop procedures for the card check system, gives the Board a
great deal of discretion in developing the procedures for the card check system,
the procedures and standards under 9(c)(7) would be unclear until the Board
promulgated these procedures and standards. As I will discuss more thoroughly
below, I believe that the card check provision is a less than desirable alternative
to the current NLRB election system because it could place employees in a dif-
ficult position. Moreover, the ambiguous language in the EFCA also makes this
provision of the Act a less than desirable alternative to the current NLRB elec-
tion system.
Although individuals on both sides of the issue have stated what will
happen as a result of these amendments, the text of the EFCA provides an am-
biguous framework for the five-member Board to use in prescribing election
conditions. Because the Board would be authorized, via the addition of the pro-
posed subsection (7) to section 9(c), 232 to establish procedures for both assessing
the validity of these cards and establishing the procedure for the card check sys-
tem, it would be unclear until the passage of the Act and the adoption of Board
procedures under 9(c)(7) as to what the standards and procedures could be.
Moreover, although other Board decisions have found that individual employees
are not a party in interest to challenge an election,233 it is equally unclear how
and whether employees can still request a secret ballot election, although some
critics have already stated that the union, rather than the individual employees
would make such a decision,234 while Senator Kennedy has stated that the pro-
posed amendments would not eliminate this option for employees.235 Currently,
228 See Weiler, supra note 43.
229 See Estreicher, supra note 45.
230 See Estreicher, supra note 223 and accompanying text.
231 See supra note 196.
232 Id.
233 See, e.g., Clarence E. Clapp, 279 N.L.R.B. 330 (1986) (holding that an individual employee,
who claimed that polls had been prematurely closed and could not vote in the election, was not a
party in interest to challenge the results of an election).
234 Orrin Hatch, Utah Republican Senator, Remarks By Senator Orrin Hatch (R-UT) to the
Heritage Foundation in Washington, D.C.: The So-Called Employee Free Choice Act: An Offer
We Can Refuse (Apr. 20, 2007) (on file with author) [hereinafter Hatch].
235 Press Release, Senator Edward M. Kennedy, D-Mass., Sen. Kennedy Issues Statement on
Republican Response to Employee Free Choice Act (June 20, 2007) (on file with author).
[Vol. I111
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however, only the employer, rather than the union organizers or individual em-
ployees, can challenge election results. 6
It generally makes sense to leave the determination of what procedures
would be used to the Board;237 however, the ambiguous language that existed in
the EFCA as it was passed in the House and introduced into the Senate during
the first session of the 1 10th Congress indicates that the Board could do any-
thing from essentially rubber-stamping the cards as valid when the union proved
it had a majority of signed authorization cards from employees, to looking over
the cards with a fine-tooth comb to ascertain whether the employees' signatures
are valid. Such a thorough inspection of the authenticity of worker's signatures
would undoubtedly result in time-consuming litigation that could involve both
employer and employee challenges regarding the authenticity of the cards.
Moreover, employers would also likely allege that union organizers or fellow
employee union supporters had coerced employees to sign the cards.
Because the Board is given great deference under the Chevron test to in-
238terpret the NLRA, it would seem as though political ideologies could greatly
shape these rules and regulations, because under Chevron, such interpretations
by the administrative agency entrusted to administer an Act are upheld as long
as they are both reasonable and lawful. 239 Therefore, although reasonable minds
could differ over what procedures the Board would likely follow when a union
presented it with authorization cards signed by a majority of unit employees, as
long as the Board comes up with a reasonable interpretation of this language
and promulgates rules and regulations in accordance with such an interpretation,
the courts would likely determine that the Board's interpretation is a valid inter-
pretation under Chevron.
240
Another fiercely debated issue in the discussions regarding the Act's
provisions is how the card check provision would likely place workers between
a rock and a hard place, because a worker's fellow employees would be asking
236 See NAT'L LABOR RELATIONS BD., Investigation, in ULP CASE HANDLING MANUAL §§
10066.1-.3 (2008), available at http://www.nlrb.gov/nlrb/legallmanuals/INVESTIGATION%
2010050%2010070.pdf.
237 See text accompanying supra note 287.
238 Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984)
(holding that where a Court is reviewing an agency's interpretation of a statute, where that agency
was empowered by Congress to interpret and or enforce the statute, the Court must first ask
whether Congress has addressed the issue directly in the plain meaning of the statute; if Congress
determines that Congress has not addressed the issue directly in the plain meaning of the statute
and the statute is ambiguous, then the agency's interpretation of the statute is given deference as
long as the interpretation is both reasonable and based on a "permissible construction of the stat-
ute") (footnote omitted). For an example of how the NLRB and various scholars have described
Chevron deference in the NLRB context, see Edwin A. Keller, Comment, Death by Textualism:
The NLRB's "Incidental to Patient Care" Supervisory Test For Charge Nurses, 46 AM. U. L.
REv. 575, 606-07 nn.181-89 and accompanying text.
239 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43.
240 Id.
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the employee to sign a union authorization card. This peer pressure from fellow
employees, coupled with the employee's knowledge that his or her employer
likely disapproves of the union, would place the employee in the precarious
position of either offending his or her boss or his or her coworkers.241 While the
current Board rules and regulations provide that the cards can be reviewed by
both union and employer's counsel, this review takes place in unfair labor prac-
tice proceedings and is not a separate hearing. 242 Therefore, under the current
Board rules, the union representatives are the only individuals that will defi-
nitely view these cards, while the employer's counsel can review the signatures
on the cards, through handwriting comparisons. 243 Accordingly, the Board's
policy of preventing employers from personally viewing these cards during
hearings prevents violations of employee confidentiality. 244 However, because
the employee's fellow employees, who are union organizers, are permitted to
view the signatures under current Board policy because they are the individuals
collecting the cards, employee union organizers could still be permitted to pres-
sure their fellow employees into signing these cards.
In contrast to the current EFCA language, the Canadian model, which
both academics and political supporters of a card check provision have touted as
ideal for reforming American labor law, generally provides specific safe-
guards 245 to ensure that the true wishes of employees are met when a union is
recognized through a majority card check.246 However, many of these provi-
241 See 154 CONG. REc. H2091 (Mar. 1, 2007).
242 Email from Anne Marie Lofaso, Associate Professor of Law at West Virginia University
College of Law, to Meghan B. Phillips, Research Editor, West Virginia Law Review Volume 111
(Jan. 21, 2008, 8:30:00 EST) (on file with author) [hereinafter Email from Anne Marie Lofaso].
(Dr. Anne Marie Lofaso was employed as a Senior NLRB Attorney, Supreme Court Branch, from
May 2004-January 2007 and NLRB Senior Attorney, Appellate Branch from March 1997-January
2007). See generally NAT'L LABOR RELATIONS BD., Deferrals, Withdrawals, Dismissals and





245 In assessing safeguards that would be similar to those in Canadian provinces, former Board
Chairman Gould suggests that "it is important to require that employees provide some sort of
payment to the union to demonstrate their support for collective bargaining... .Some form of pay-
ment by employees to unions in the form of an initiation fee or dues should be a necessary prereq-
uisite for majority support. Perhaps a super-majority of 55 or 60 percent of card signers should be
required as well, so as to resolve any doubt about majority status." Gould, supra note 8, at 497.
246 Professor Weiler describes the various ways in which the various Canadian provinces have
dealt with the issue of ensuring the wishes of employees are met when using card checks as fol-
lows:
For example, each employee must sign a membership card application and
pay a small membership fee at the same time that he signs the authorization
card. See Plateau Mills, Ltd. v. International Woodworkers [1977], I CAN.
LAB. REL. BD. REP. (Butterworth) 82, 83-84 (1976). A worker is unlikely to
(Vol. I111
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sions, such as requiring more than a simple majority, conflict with the current
plain language reading of the EFCA, which would require certification upon
showing a "majority of employees. 2 47 The current language of the EFCA could
therefore possibly remove the Board's ability to require that a greater number of
employees other than a simple majority of employees, defined as one vote over
fifty percent of the employees in the bargaining unit, sign these authorization
cards.
Regardless of whether the Board would use guidance from its current
practices and regulations when examining the authorization cards, because the
language in the EFCA is so ambiguous, it is difficult to determine what result
future Board policies and procedures could give employees. Many individuals
opposed to the card check provision of the EFCA, find the card check provision
problematic because, although it would likely shorten the time to certify a union
greatly, it could also put employees in a precarious position. 248 These opponents
of the card check provision argue that because union officials and union sup-
porting employees have the ability to go to employees' homes or other social
establishments and ask them to sign an authorization card or to ask their feelings
on unionization, without committing an unfair labor practice,249 employees
take these steps in the off-hand manner in which he might sign a petition. A
number of jurisdictions require a special majority before certification may be
granted on the basis of cards alone. See., e.g., Labour Code of British Colum-
bia, B.C. REV. STAT. ch. 212, § 45 (1979) (requiring 55% card support). On-
tario adds the further wrinkle that employees may petition to withdraw their
card memberships within approximately one week after the filing of the certi-
fication application. See Ontario Labour Relations Act, ONT. REV. STAT.
ch. 228, § 103(2)j) (1980); D CARTER & J. WOON, UNION
RECOGNITION IN ONTARIO 4-5 (1981). In the relatively infrequent in-
stances ... in which such revocations (untainted by employer involvement)
reduce the union card majority to a level below 55%, the Board will conduct a
certification election. See Ontario Labor Relations Act, ONT. REV. STAT.
ch. 228, § 7(2) (1980). In implementing these safeguards, the Canadian model
uses the secret ballot vote as a reserve instrument rather than as a frontline
weapon. When there is any tangible doubt about the original card majority,
the Board simply schedules a vote to resolve the issue. See Plateau Mills,
[1977] I CAN. LAB. REL. BD. REP. (Butterworth) at 88-89.... But under the
"date of application" rule, the employer itself is not able to create such doubt
and secure an election reversal by staging a protracted campaign to turn its
employees' sentiments around.
Weiler, supra note 43, at 1809 n.146.
247 See H.R. 800, 110th Cong. § 3 (as placed on the Senate calendar, Mar. 2, 2007) (text printed
supra note 196).
248 See generally supra note 12 and accompanying text; See also infra note 283 and accompa-
nying text.
249 If an employer were to visit an employee's home to discuss the employee's position on
unionization, such visit would almost always constitute a violation of 8(a)(l). For an example of
where the Board found such an unfair labor practice, see Scott & Scott, 113 N.L.R.B. 911, 924
(1955), where the Board found a violation of 8(a)(1) when an employer visited an employee's
home on a Sunday because "he wanted to 'figure out' whether the union could 'get in' or not ......
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could feel a great deal of peer pressure to sign the authorization cards. Although
not all union officials or union supporters would do this, and the substantial
majority of union organizers would not engage in such tactics, the news that a
particular employee was or was not supporting the union could be quite damag-
ing to both an individual employee's reputation and working life.250 For exam-
ple, while an employer commits an unfair labor practice when the employer
discriminates against an employee for his or her support or lack of support for a
labor organization,251 there is no similar NLRA provision that would prevent
fellow employees from giving each other the cold shoulder or not being friendly
to one another because individuals have the First Amendment right of freedom
of association.252 Therefore, if the union organizers' behavior remains non-
violent and does not otherwise rise to the level of coerciveness to prove an
8(b)( 1),253 such behavior could occur.254  Furthermore, in particularly small
towns, where most of the town's citizens are employed by a particular em-
ployer, or where a great deal of the town's livelihood otherwise depends upon
employment with the employer, if an employee wished to not vote for unioniza-
tion, public knowledge of such a vote could hurt the employee's reputation.
This harm to the employee's reputation could, at another extreme, also harm the
non-union supporting employees' children, as these children would then become
targets for harassment because his or her parent was a bad person for not sup-
255porting the union.
250 See Elaine L. Chao, Defining Democracy Down, WALL ST. J., Jan. 20, 2007, at A17 ("One
does not have to be a scholar on card check [sic] to anticipate the pressure and coercion that could
then emanate from all sides.").
251 See generally GORMAN & F1NKIN, supra note 116, at § 7.3, at 158-62.
252 "[T]he Board will not find an unfair labor practice or set aside an election if the union's
threat was isolated, de minimis, was not widely disseminated and did not 'create an atmosphere of
fear or reprisals."' Id. at § 7.15, at 207; see also Advance Products, 304 N.L.R.B. 436 (1991)
(where the Board found that the statement of "watch your back" did not explicitly threaten harm
and was not widely disseminated, and therefore not sufficient to constitute an 8(b)(1) violation);
Service America Corp., 298 N.L.R.B. 736 (1990) (finding that a threat to "rough up" was too
remote to establish an 8(b)(1) violation or set aside an election).
Additionally, "although a union's assurance that takes the form 'You will be laid off from your
job, unless you vote for the union' is normally allowable electioneering, a slight change in word-
ing, 'If you vote against the union, you will be fired'-in the context of factual circumstances-
can take on coercive overtones. GORMAN & FINKIN, supra note 116, at 206 n.2 (quoting NLRB v.
Superior Coatings, 839 F.2d 1178 (6th Cir. 1988)).
254 Id.
255 As an aside, I know that these are just examples of what could happen and are in no way
representative of the majority of possible situations, because most towns are spread out and em-
ployees do not know each other and their families that well. However, this could be a realistic
outcome in a smaller West Virginia town. Being from a heavily-unionized area in a small town
myself, and experiencing several strikes at various plants within ten miles of my home, I know
how important unionization is to workers. I also know, from stories of various people who were
not fervent union supporters, that an individual takes a great deal of flack if they will not walk the
picket line during a strike or otherwise support the union.
[Vol. I111
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In addition to pressures from union supporters and officials, such a pub-
lic vote would likely make some employees feel as though voting for the union
would make their employer upset with them. Although the employee would be
protected from most retaliation by the employer, because an employer cannot
discriminate against an employee for supporting the union, 56 if the employer
had knowledge that the employee signed an authorization card, relations that
were previously very amicable could become very business-like and formalistic.
For example, employers do not have to authorize days off when such a decision
is at the employer's discretion. Moreover, because most hiring decisions are
management prerogatives, even if the union is given some say in the hiring
process via the collective bargaining agreement, an employer's knowledge of an
employee's vote on unionization could factor into the employer's hiring deci-
sion. For example, if the employee who signed the union authorization card was
up for promotion against another similarly-qualified candidate who did sign the
authorization card, then the employer could either consciously or unconsciously
permit the employer's knowledge regarding whether the employee did or did not
sign an authorization card factor into the promotion decision, without such deci-
sion amounting to an 8(a)(3).
A statistic Richard Trumka, Secretary Treasurer of the AFL-CIO, pre-
sented in a statement illustrates how one-sided the debate over unionization
could become if the card check system were implemented. In his statement,
Trumka stated that eighty-percent of union organizing takes place away from
the Board.258 Moreover, the "vast majority of organizational drives in the
United States occur in comparatively small employee units," and "[i]n such
units, unions' efforts generally take place quickly and invisibly and produce a
majority in just a few days or not at all., 259 Therefore, requiring the Board to
certify a union upon the union showing that a simple majority of bargaining unit
employees signed authorization cards would essentially prevent employers from
bringing other information about unionization to the table at all. While I do not
approve of the Board's decisions that have both prohibited employees from opt-
ing out of captive audience speeches and prevented unions from receiving simi-
lar access to the employee electorate,26 ° the card check system could ultimately
On the other hand, I also recognize that a union supporter's fellow employees oftentimes bully the
union supporter when the union supporters constitute the minority of employees. For an example
of the violence and hostile communications that have resulted from union organizing drives in
West Virginia, see the facts presented in State v. Foley, 35 S.E.2d 854 (W. Va. 1945).
2_% GOpMAN & FINKIN, supra note 116, at § 7.3, 158-62.
257 Id.
258 Gould, supra note 8, at 485.
259 Weiler, supra note 43, at 1807.
260 For a discussion of captive audience speeches, see the United States Supreme Court's recent
decision in Brown v. Chamber of Commerce, 128 S.Ct. 2408 (2008). In Brown, the United States
Supreme Court determined that the state of California's efforts to prevent employers who received
state Medicaid and Medicare funding from using those funds to advocate an anti-union position
was pre-empted under the Machinsts preemption doctrine.
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have the same effect of limiting discussion of the issues because it would enable
only union representatives to present their side of the story and cause an elector-
ate to vote with incomplete information.
2 6 1
Undoubtedly, the current election system is imperfect, because it can
drag on for a great deal of time, especially when ULP's are involved.262 Addi-
tionally, the NLRB's decisions on captive audience speeches, which have de-
termined that an employer may not only require263 employees to attend captive
audience speeches, 264 but also forbid the employee from leaving the captive
audience speech, are also problematic for union organization. 265 Moreover, an
employer is neither required to give a union equal time during the elections,266
267nor prohibited from excluding union organizers from their property. Accord-
ingly, while I think the current election system is unbalanced and should provide
the unions with equal access to the electorate, the card check system could still
result in a system of an uninformed electorate.
Unfortunately, supporters of a card check are overlooking the very dif-
ficult position in which the EFCA's provisions could place an employee. This
oversight is particularly troubling because the EFCA's proposed remedial pow-
ers268 in and of themselves would likely decrease the frequency of unfair labor
practices that currently inhibit employee free choice in elections. Furthermore,
although employer unfair labor practices definitely hinder employee free choice
in secret ballot elections, when an employer commits a great deal of unfair labor
practices, the Board still has remedial power to issue a Gissel bargaining or-
der.
269
261 See generally Gould, supra note 8, at 485.
262 Weiler, supra note 43, at 1797 (stating that "an enforceable order for relief [in unfair labor
practice cases] will not be available for almost three years," and "[dielay is the Achilles heal of
the regulatory approach to the representation process under the NLRA.").
263 See Litton Systems, Inc., 173 N.L.R.B. 1024 (1968) (determining that employer could law-
fully require that employees attend captive audience speeches during work time).
264 A captive audience speech is a time where an employer requires employees to attend meet-
ings during their workday where the employer makes anti-union speeches. See DOUGLAS E. RAY,
CALVIN WILLIAM SHARPE & ROBERT N. STRASSFELD, UNDERSTANDING LABOR LAw 83-84 (2nd ed.
2005) [hereinafter RAY, SHI-ARPE & STRASSFELD].
265 Litton Systems, Inc., 173 N.L.R.B. 1024 (1968) (determining that employer did not commit
an unfair labor practice against an employee who showed up late to one captive audience speech
and left early from another captive audience speech).
266 NLRB v. United Steelworkers, 357 U.S. 357 (1958). See generally RAY, SHARPE &
STRASSFELD, supra note 264, at 83-85.
267 See Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527 (1992) (determining that employers could ex-
clude union organizers from their property based on state law trespass principles).
268 See discussion infra Part 1V.B.2.
269 A Gissel bargaining order is a Board remedy granted to unions, when the union at some
time during the organization campaign had actual majority status, but the union was either unable
to hold an election because of the influx of employer unfair labor practices or the union lost the
election because the election process was tainted with employer unfair labor practices. These
orders are rarely granted and only granted in the most extreme circumstances, because of em-
[Vol. I111
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In addition to the remedial powers contained in the EFCA, unions have
effective alternative organizing techniques outside of the card provision in the
proposed EFCA. For instance, unions can currently seek voluntary recognition
through a card check agreement if both the union and the employer enter into a
contract wherein the employee agrees to voluntarily recognize the union if a
majority of employees signs authorization cards.27 ° As discussed by the Su-
preme Court in Gissel Packing, almost from the inception of the Act, although
elections have been deemed the Board's preferred method of ascertaining a la-
bor organization's majority status, a labor organization can establish majority
status from a union called strike or strike vote, or from a "possession of cards
signed by a majority of the employees authorizing the union to represent them
for collective bargaining purposes. 27 '
Under current law, employers can agree to a "card check" as an alterna-
tive to a Board election and recognize and bargain with a labor organization
after it is determined that the union has obtained majority status from the
cards.272 Therefore, although the most frequently utilized method of ascertain-
ing majority support for a labor organization is still the Board election, creative
and well-organized unions have experienced increasing success in getting both
state and local government officials, as well as community leaders, to encourage
employers in their areas to voluntarily recognize a union on the basis of a card
check. For example, since 2005, the Communications Workers of America
("CWA") has organized more than 20,000 workers at Cingular Wireless, while
the Service Employees International Union ("SEIU") has organized 5,000 jani-
tors in Houston on the basis of card checks, due in large part to the backing of
local officials who encouraged employers to accept the card check agree-
ments. 73 One comprehensive study of such card check agreements found that
when employers and unions agree to utilize a card check procedure and/or a
neutrality agreement, unions achieve a majority status 62.5% of the time with
card check-only agreements, and 78.2% with card check with neutrality agree-
ployer unfair labor practices that prohibit an election where employees can vote uninhibited by the
coercive environment created by the employer's unfair labor practices. GORMAN & FINKIN, supra
note 116, § 6.2, at 112-116. For a general discussion of the Gissel bargaining order and its im-
plementation in practice, see id. § § 6.2-6.3, at 112-27.
270 See RAY, SHARPE & STRASSFELD, supra note 264, at 106 (discussing how neutrality agree-
ments have become an effective tool in combating employer lawlessness).
271 Gissel Packing Co. v. NLRB, 395 U.S. 575, 596-97 (1969) (citing Denver Auto Dealers
Ass'n., 10 N.L.R.B. 1173 (1939) (union called strike when employer refused to recognize union's
majority status) and Century Mills, Inc., 5 N.L.R.B. 807 (1938) (union called strike when em-
ployer refused to recognize union's majority status)).
272 See RAY, SHARPE & STRASSFELD, supra note 264, at 106.
273 Kris Maher, How Union Members Drive Garner Local Support-Elected Officials Try to
Get Employers to Accept Process that Avoids Secret Ballots, WALL ST. J., Dec. 11, 2006, at A2.
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ments, in comparison to the 45.64% success rate of overall NLRB election win
rates from 1983-98.274
The unfortunate down-side to the voluntary card check and neutrality
agreements is that an employer can lawfully disagree with the union's proposi-
tion to recognize it on the basis of a card check so long as the employer has not
engaged in other unfair labor practices that would render such a refusal an unfair
labor practice. Additionally, the union, and not the employer, has the duty to
request a Board election upon the employer's refusal to agree to the card
check.275 However, once an employer agrees to a card check agreement, the
employer violates 8(a)(5) if it refuses to thereafter recognize the bargain with
the union simply because the employer did not wish for the union to obtain ma-
jority representative status.276
Although reasonable minds could differ over whether a card check
should replace the current NLRB election, the card check alternative is also an
imperfect solution for increasing workers' ability to unionize. Although elec-
tions are imperfect and oftentimes result in election processes that can endure
for long periods, these potentially unjust results do not justify potentially plac-
ing employees between a rock and a hard place. The secret-ballot election is the
only means of truly protecting an employees' right to vote for or against a un-
ion. Moreover, although the current system of elections is imperfect, unions and
employees truly wishing to be represented by unions are not completely power-
less. This is so because organized labor can still be very creative and powerful
in convincing employers to agree to voluntary recognition by card check, as
detailed by the success stories described above. Hopefully, stronger remedies
will aid in lowering the occurrences of employer unfair labor practices in the
future, and therefore allow employees to exercise greater free will in voting for
or against unionization. Furthermore, when an employer commits a great deal
of unfair labor practices, the Board still has the remedy of a Gissel bargaining
order,277 although the remedy will never right the wrongs felt by some employ-
ees. However, the unfortunate practices of some unfair and unscrupulous em-
ployers should not control the right of the majority of employees to have a se-
cret ballot election.
274 Adrienne E. Eaton & Jill Kriesky, Union Organizing Under Neutrality and Card Check
Agreements, 55 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REv. 42, 51-52 (2001).
275 Linden Lumber Div., Summers & Co. v. NLRB, 419 U.S. 301 (1974).
276 See Rockwell Int'l Corp., 220 N.L.R.B. 1262 (1975); Sullivan Elec. Co., 199 N.L.R.B. 809
(1972), enforced, 479 F.2d 1270 (6th Cir. 1973); see also Montgomery Ward & Co., 210 N.L.R.B.
717, 724 n.18 (1974) (determining that when an employer unilaterally decides to determine major-
ity status through a poll, the employer violates 8(a)(5) if it subsequently refuses to bargain with
the union even after determining the union's majority status through the poll); Texas Petrochemi-
cals Corp., 296 N.L.R.B. 1057 (1989) (determining that a union is not bound by employer's de-
termination of a "loss" in an employer-conducted unilateral poll, and the union remains free to
seek certification through a Board election), rev'd on other grounds, 923 F.2d 398 (5th Cir. 1991).
277 See infra notes 286-316 and accompanying text; see also Murphy, supra note 213, at 73-77.
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2. Providing More Effective Remedies for Violations of Employ-
ees' Right to Organize
One of the famous lines from William Shakespeare's MacBeth is
"Things without all remedy should be without regard. 2 78 This statement has
proven true in the NLRB context, as many unscrupulous employers have disre-
garded employees' federal right to unionize, because the Board-issued deter-
rents or remedies for such violations are nominal in comparison to the increased
cost of unionization.
It is likely that the seminal proposition that advocates of labor law re-
form have been pushing for years is that the Board needs stronger remedial
279powers to enforce the rights guaranteed by the Act. In May 2006, the high
incidence of these employer-committed unfair labor practices prompted the
Bush administration-appointed NLRB General Counsel Meisburg to "express []
concern about the high incidence of unfair labor practice charges.' 28 ° Moreover,
because of the backlog of unfair labor practices charges at the Board and the
time that typically elapses between the filing of a charge and a Board hearing, in
recent years the NLRB has placed great emphasis on alternative dispute resolu-
tion tactics such as mediation and settlement.28' Furthermore, the inefficiency
and delay at the NLRB have permitted certain employers to delay elections and
unionization by committing unfair labor practices.
Providing greater remedial powers to the Board to more adequately de-
ter violations of the NLRA is likely the area of labor law reform that has the
most universal support of individuals of all political parties, and may have even
been the one provision contained in EFCA on which both full-fledged support-
ers of the Act and the opponents of provisions, namely the card check and arbi-
tration/mediation provision, could agree.283 Although political realities and ide-
ologies will likely prevent this compromise from materializing,2 8 the various
278 WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, MACBETH act 3, sc. 2.
279 See generally Worster, supra note 10.
280 HARPER, ESTREICHER & FLYNN, supra note 16, at 483.
281 Id.
282 See discussion supra Part III.B. 1.
283 See, e.g., Chao, supra note 250, at AI7. (Ms. Chao is the U.S. Secretary of Labor and op-
posed the EFCA because she disagreed with the card check provision); see also Hatch, supra note
234 (Senator Hatch, one of the greatest opponents of the EFCA in the Senate, stated that he op-
posed EFCA because of both the card check provision and the arbitration and mediation provi-
sions, but voiced no disagreement with the remedies provisions of the EFCA); Press Release,
Senator John McCain, R-Ariz., Senator McCain Statement on The Importance of Protecting the
Secret Ballot Process (June 26, 2007) (on file with author) (Senator McCain expressed only fear
over the potential elimination of a secret ballot election and proposed S.1312, the Secret Ballot
Protection Act of 2007, to ensure that secret ballots were not eliminated in the union context.
Moreover, he expressed no concern over the remedies provisions of the EFCA).
284 See, e.g., Organizing Gambit, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 5, 2006, at A24 (stating that the two main
supporters of EFCA, Representative George Miller of California, and Senator Ted Kennedy of
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political speeches that I have analyzed indicate that most members of Congress,
regardless of their political party affiliation, would have supported giving the
Board some sort of stronger remedial powers.
Currently, the relief that the Board can grant for violations of the Act,
which is listed in Section 10 of the Act, 285 is limited to make-whole relief,
which is the equivalent of the Board slapping offending employers on the wrist
when the employer violates the Act. In general, violations of section 8(a)(1)
will ordinarily only result in the Board issuing a cease-and-desist order and
other affirmative action, such as a posting in the place of employment where the
offending party denounces previous actions and recognizes that such actions
were unlawful, while 8(a)(5) violations will carry the additional affirmative ac-
tion of a Board order directing the offending party to bargain in good faith with
the aggrieved party at the aggrieved party's request.
2 86
The Supreme Court in its decision in Phelps Dodge described the pow-
ers vested to the National Labor Relations Board in fashioning remedial relief as
follows:
A statute expressive of such large public policy as that on which
the National Labor Relations Board is based must be broadly
phrased and necessarily carries with it the task of administrative
application. There is an area plainly covered by the language of
the Act and an area no less plainly without it. But in the nature
of things Congress could not catalogue all the devices and
stratagems for circumventing the policies of the Act. Nor could
it define the whole gamut of remedies to effectuate these poli-
cies in an infinite variety of specific situations. Congress met
these difficulties by leaving the adaptation of means to end to
the empiric process of administration. The exercise of the proc-
ess was committed to the Board, subject to limited judicial re-
view. Because the relation of remedy to policy is peculiarly a
matter for administrative competence, courts must not enter the
allowable area of the Board's discretion and must guard against
the danger of sliding unconsciously from the narrow confines of
law into the more spacious domain of policy. On the other hand,
the power with which Congress invested the Board implies re-
Massachusetts, also receive large contributions, accounting for approximately one-third of Ken-
nedy's total campaign contributions, from labor organizations); see also, Jeanne Cummings, Poli-
tics & Economics: Business Seeks to Defeat Bill on Unions, WALL ST. J., Feb. 14, 2007, at A 13
("Even if the bill fails, labor leaders want recorded votes in both chambers so they have a record
for the 2008 elections.").
285 National Labor Relations Act § 10(c), 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (2007).
286 See generally GORMAN & FINKIN, supra note 116, §§ 22.1-22.4, at 718-31.
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sponsibility - the responsibility of exercising its judgment in
employing the statutory powers.287
Accordingly, while the Board's remedial powers under the Act are
broad, such powers are limited to what many refer to as "make whole relief."
For example, the Board can neither order that either party insert a provision into
the collective bargaining agreement nor order that a party agree to inserting a
provision into a collective bargaining agreement, and can only order that either
the union or the employer cease and desist from refusing to bargain in good
faith and direct the offending party to engage in collective bargaining, if re-
quested by the aggrieved party.288 Therefore, in 8(a)(5) cases, the Board gener-
ally issues cease-and-desist orders, issues bargaining orders that require the
party who committed the unfair labor practice to bargain at the aggrieved
party's request, and takes other affirmative action as necessary to grant relief to
the parties.289
The Supreme Court has described the Board's role in granting remedial
8(a)(3) relief as "a restoration of the situation, as nearly as possible, to that
which would have been obtained but for the illegal discrimination., 290 Accord-
ingly, the amount of back pay due to an employee discriminatorily discharged,
laid-off, or refused initial employment or reinstatement because the employee
exercised his or her Section 7 rights, is ordinarily determined at a separate hear-
ing called the "compliance stage.,, 29' Furthermore, the employee is required, in
accord with the common law principles of contracts, to mitigate his or her dam-
ages.292 Moreover, the remedies and the procedures for violations of 8(a)(4),
which occurs when an employer discriminates against an employee subjecting
the employee to adverse employment actions, including written warnings or
termination, are substantially similar to those remedies and procedures for
8(a)(3).
291
The most extreme Board remedy for employer unfair labor practices
during a union certification election is undoubtedly a Gisse2 94 bargaining order,
287 Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 194 (1941).
288 H.K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99, 108 (1970).
289 See generally GORMAN & FINKIN, supra note 116, §§ 22.1-22.4, at 718-31. For an interest-
ing twist on the remedy for a midterm modification of a permissive subject of bargaining that does
not comply with 8(d) and would result in a violation of 8(a)(5) if such modification was in regard
to a mandatory subject of bargaining, see Allied Chem. & Alkali Workers v. Pittsburgh Plate
Glass, 404 U.S. 157, 188 (1971) ("[t]he remedy for a unilateral mid-term modification of a per-
missive term lies in an action for breach of contract," rather than in an unfair labor practice pro-
ceeding that would result if such modification was for a mandatory subject of bargaining).
290 Phelps Dodge, 313 U.S. at 194.
291 See generally GORMAN & FINKtN, supra note 116, § 7.4, at 162-65.
292 Id.
293 Id. §7.5, at 165-68.
294 Gissel Packing Co. v. NLRB, 395 U.S. 575 (1969).
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a Board-issued order that requires an employer to bargain with a union because
the employer conduct has been so pervasive as to affect the Board's ability to
ascertain employee free choice in an election.295 The Board only issues Gissels
in rare circumstances and only issues Gissels when it finds extreme circum-
stances of employer misconduct for unfair labor practices.296 If the Board feels
as though the traditional remedies of cease-and-desist orders and re-run elec-
tions are insufficient to ensure a fair election, then the Board must explain its
reasoning for issuing a bargaining order.297 The Board issues Gissel bargaining
orders when it determines that "hallmark violations," which include actual or
threatened plant closure, various threats of job loss, and 8(a)(3) discriminatory
discharges, are so coercive as to have a lasting effect that would cloud an em-
ployee's free choice when voting in a secret ballot election.298 In addition to the
Gissel bargaining order, the Board also has the authority to seek 10(j) injunctive
relief in unfair labor practice cases. In fiscal year 2006, the Board authorized
10(j) discretionary injunctive relief for unfair labor practices in thirty-six per-
cent of cases, and had a success rate2
99 of ninety-four percent in these cases. 300
For fiscal year 2006, the majority of all charges filed against employers
were 8(a)(5) refusal to bargain cases, accounting for 8,467 charges received by
the Board and fifty-four percent of all charges alleging that employers had
committed unfair labor practices. 30 1 The second highest number of charges
were in alleged discriminatory discharge cases for violations of 8(a)(3) and
8(a)(4) of the Act, which accounted for 7,158 filed charges and forty-six percent
of all charges filed that alleged employer unfair labor practices.30 2 Furthermore,
"[d]uring the fiscal year, 36.9 percent of the cases were settled or adjusted be-
fore issuance of administrative law judges' decisions, 31.3 percent were with-
295 Id. at 613-620 (declining, over the arguments by the employers' counsel, to find that a
cease-and-desist order and a re-run election would be an adequate solution to the issue of perva-
sive employer unfair labor practices, because "[i]f an employer has succeeded in undermining a
union's strength and destroying the laboratory conditions necessary for a fair election, he may see
no need to violate a cease-and-desist order by further unlawful activity").
296 Id. It must be noted that although Gissel bargaining orders are effective tools to deter em-
ployer unfair labor practices, the anti-labor Bush Board has neglected to issue any Gissel orders in
the past few years. See September Massacre, supra note 15, at 10-11.
297 Douglas Foods Corp. v. NLRB, 251 F.3d 1056, 1065-1067 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (rebuking the
Board for failing to adequately explain why traditional remedies are insufficient to ensure a fair
election).
298 See NLRB v. Jamaica Towing, 632 F.2d 208, 212-213 (2d Cir. 1980) (generally discussing
the need for bargaining orders when hallmark violations have occurred); General Fabrications
Corp., 328 N.L.R.B. 1114 (1999), enfd, 222 F.3d 218 (6th Cir. 2000); Michael's Painting, Inc.,
337 N.L.R.B. 860 (2002).
299 The Board deems a 10(j) injunction case a success if it resulted in either a satisfactory set-
tlement or a substantial victory in litigation. MEISBURG, supra note 129.
300 id.
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drawn before complaint, and 28.3 percent were administratively dismissed. 3 °3
Additionally, for 8(a)(3) and 8(a)(4) discriminatory discharge or discriminatory
employment action cases, the NLRB obtained 2,926 offers of job reinstatement,
and such reinstatement offers were accepted by employees in approximately
eighty-three percent of cases. 304 Consequently, the fact that employees accepted
reinstatement offers at such a high rate could lead one to reasonably conclude
that while employers can make their firms more mobile, employees can neither
find other substantially similar employment in the same area nor move to an-
other location for employment.
As one can surmise from the aforementioned limitations on the Board's
remedial powers and the amount of unfair labor practices that employers com-
mit, the current Board "make-whole remedies" are entirely inadequate. Many
employers, regardless of their intent, have used a general cost-benefit analysis to
determine that the potential effects of engaging in activities that violate the
NLRA, which could at most result in the Board requiring the employer to pay a
discharged employee back pay plus interest, is a much smaller cost than the
increased transaction costs associated with a unionized work force.30 5 The po-
tential of a $20,000 civil fine for every occurrence of an 8(a)(1) violation in the
first contract setting and for any occurrence of an 8(a)(3) violation, regardless of
whether the 8(a)(3) violation occurs in the first contract setting or in subsequent
unionization efforts, would likely make some employers think twice about
committing these unfair labor practices.30 6 Moreover, because the amendment
contained in the EFCA would require that the Board seek an injunction when it
deemed an 8(a)(1) or 8(a)(3) charge meritorious, the employer could also be
deterred by the potential costs of a judge finding the employer to be in contempt
of court.3 01
However, although the suggested civil fines of the EFCA will likely
cause some smaller employers to think twice about discharging an employee for
his or her union activities, it would likely not be the case for the world's largest
privately-owned company-Wal-Mart. For example, three Wal-Mart employ-
ees in Southern Nevada sought to bring in the United Food and Commercial
Workers union to their Wal-Mart store in 2000, and Wal-Mart took adverse em-
ployment action against the three employees.30 8 When the NLRB issued its de-
cision seven years later, it determined that Wal-Mart had acted illegally and that
its punishment would be to pay lost wages of a few thousand dollars to one of
303 Id. at 8-9.
304 Id. at2.
305 See Phillips, supra note 90, at 6-13.
306 See supra note 201.
307 Id.
308 Michael J. Mishak & David McGrath Schwartz, Wal-Mart Breaks the Law, Gets Punished,
Wins Anyway: Retailer Fends Off Unions, Thanks to Weak Federal Watchdogs With Few Teeth,
LAS VEGAS SUN ONLINE, Sept. 14, 2007, http://www.lasvegussun.com/news/2007/sep/14/wal-
mart-breaks-the-law-gets-punished-wins-anyway/ (last visited Nov. 5, 2008).
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the employees that it refused to promote because of his union activities, and it
must also post notices in three of its stores disclosing its labor law violations.30 9
As this example illustrates, stronger deterrents are needed to combat unscrupu-
lous employers, such as Wal-Mart, from committing unfair labor practices to
prevent employees from unionizing the workplace. Therefore, the Board should
also be granted the ability to sanction such actions in the same manner that fed-
eral bankruptcy judges are permitted to sanction creditors who violate the auto-
matic stay in bankruptcy. 3'0 The money from these civil sanctions could then go
into the NLRB general fund to provide for operation costs.
If Congress granted much stronger remedial powers to the Board, many
of the current employers who commit unfair labor practices will be deterred by
the threat of such monetary sanctions. Moreover, with remedial powers, such as
those given to federal bankruptcy judges when creditors violate the automatic
stay, the Board could even potentially deter larger employers such as Wal-Mart.
The alternative of providing stronger remedies than were included in the EFCA,
as it was introduced by Senator Kennedy and Representative Miller during the
first session of the 110th Congress, could prevent a large percentage of unfair
labor practices that currently occur in the first contract setting. Proponents of
the card check provision have justified the inclusion of the card check provision
on the proposition that the election process is so drawn out, especially because
of the high percentage of unfair labor practices that occur during the first con-
tract setting. Accordingly, if Congress created stronger deterrents to these em-
ployers' actions by granting the Board stronger remedial powers, the implemen-
tation of such deterrents would likely eliminate the card check proponents' ar-
gument that certifying unions on a card check is the most effective means to
deal with employer unfair labor practices because employers will be less likely
to commit unfair labor practices. Accordingly, in the future the Board could
309 Id. ("[T]he United Food and Commercial Workers union filed 288 unfair labor practice
charges against Wal-Mart from 1998 to 2003. Of those charges, at least 94 resulted in the NLRB
filing formal complaints against the retailer, resulting in at least 11 rulings against the company
and 12 settlements.").
310 11 U.S.C. §362(k) (2006) states that Chapter 7 debtors who can prove "an injury due to a
willful violation of the automatic stay can recover actual damages, including attorney's fees, and
potentially, punitive damages." Ann K. Wooster, What Constitutes "Willful Violation" of Auto-
matic Stay Provisions of Bankruptcy Code (11 U.S.C..A. §362(k)) Sufficient to Award Damages-
Chapter 7 Cases, 23 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 339 (2007); see also, Philip White, Jr., Bankruptcy Rule 9011
Sanctions in Chapter 7 Bankruptcy Proceedings, 11 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 435 (2006). For an example
of how some courts have sanctioned creditors for violating the automatic stay, see In re Nosek,
363 B.R. 643 (U.S. Bankr. Ct., D. Mass., 2007) (awarding debtor emotional distress damages in
the amount of $250,000 and punitive damages in the amount of $500,000 for violating the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing required under Massachusetts law, when the servicer held
debtor's payments, regardless of whether they were sent directly from her or from the Chapter 13
Trustee, in "suspense accounts" rather than applying them to the balance due on the mortgage, and
then applied late fees to the debtor's account despite timely payments, in addition to other in-
stances of applying debtor's payments in both improper and untimely fashions. Debtor was also
awarded nominal damages of $1.00 and $25.00 for the REPSA and Massachusetts Consumer
Protection Act violations, respectively).
[Vol. I111
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ultimately be dealing with a much smaller number of unfair labor practice cases
because many employers would likely be deterred from committing unfair labor
practices if these same employers knew that their actions could result in much
stronger sanctions. Consequently, the Board would be able to deal with the re-
maining unfair labor practice charges in a more efficient manner and subse-
quently sanction unscrupulous employers for such violations.
3. Permissive Mediation, Followed by Mandatory Arbitration in
First Contract Cases
Proponents of the EFCA undoubtedly backed the mediation and arbitra-
tion provisions contained in the EFCA because of the high rate of 8(a)(5) refusal
to bargain cases31 1 and the low success rate in first contract cases. 31 2 In recent
years, the NLRB has placed great emphasis on alternative means of resolving
disputes, including mediation and settlements,31 3 and immediately notified the
FMCS of all NLRB certifications to place "special emphasis on the mediation of
first contracts. 314
Despite the best efforts of the NLRB, in the year 2005, approximately
fifty-percent of all charges filed with the NLRB that alleged unlawful refusal to
bargain violations occurred in first contract cases. After these filings, the Re-
gional Offices determined twenty-eight percent of these charges were deemed
meritorious, and issued formal complaints against the offending parties shortly
thereafter. 1 5 However, the Board was not permitted to inject terms into these
collective bargain agreements, even if it found that an employer had violated
8(a)(5) by refusing to bargain in good faith with the union, because the Board is
limited to issuing make-whole remedies.31 6 I believe that Congress should give
the Board the discretion through stronger remedial powers to require arbitration
in bad faith cases to reduce the high occurrence of 8(a)(5) violations. However,
although reasonable minds could differ in assessing whether permitting media-
tion followed by mandatory arbitration is desirable or not, I believe that the pro-
311 See supra note 301 and accompanying text.
312 See generally 153 CONG. REc. H2043 (daily ed. Mar. 1, 2007).
313 SEVENTY-FIRST, supra note 135, at 2.
314 HARPER, ESTREICHER & FLYNN, supra note 16, at 483.
315 Id.
316 H.K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99, 107-08 (1970) (determining that the Board cannot
insert contractual provisions for the parties, regardless of any bad faith or refusal to bargain that
would violate §8(a)(5), because "[i]t is implicit in the structure of the Act that the Board acts to
oversee and referee the process of collective bargaining, leaving the results of the contest to the
bargaining strengths of the parties"); see also, NLRB v. American Nat. Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395,
404 (1952) (stating that "it is clear that the Board may not, either directly or indirectly, compel the
concessions or otherwise sit in judgment upon the substantive terms of collective bargaining
agreements"); NLRB v. Ins. Agents' Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477, 487 (1960) (stating that "it re-
mains clear that §8(d) was an attempt by Congress to prevent the Board from controlling the set-
tling of the terms of collective bargaining agreements").
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visions of the EFCA that could require arbitration in decisions that will bind the
parties for two years is undesirable. Rather, because such decisions may not
reflect the positions of either party and would likely reflect the opinions of po-
tentially politically appointed arbitration officials, such a provision would cause
uncertainty in the decision-making process in the same way that the current pol-
icy-oscillation practices of the five-member Board have caused uncertainty in
labor law.
The proposed addition of subsection (h) to Section 8 of the NLRA, as
contained in the proposed EFCA,317 gives either party the ability to contact the
FMCS if the parties have not come to an agreement within ninety days from the
date on "which bargain is commenced, or such additional period as the parties
may agree upon., 318 Once this request is made, if "the Service is not able to
bring the parties to agreement by conciliation" within the thirty day period that
begins on the date the request for mediation is made, then the FCMS must refer
"the dispute to an arbitration board established in accordance with such regula-
tions as may be prescribed by the Service., 319 The arbitration board's decision
is then "binding upon the parties for a period of two years, unless amended dur-
ing such period by written consent of the parties."
320
The statutory language of 8(h)321 could create potential difficulties for
five important reasons. First, the ambiguity of the language in this provision
does not provide a great deal of guidance to the Board. Accordingly, this ambi-
guity could result in the Board interpreting the language of the statute in a myr-
iad of ways. Second, the political biases of either the Board members or the
personal ideologies of potential "neutral" arbitration board members have great
potential to influence the terms of contracts. Third, such a provision would cre-
ate the incentive for either the union or the employer to play bargaining hardball
if that party believed that the arbitration board will decide more favorable con-
tract provisions than they could receive from bargaining with the other party.
Fourth, such arbitration could result in contracts that do not reflect the position
of employees. Finally, because the EFCA would only require the mediation and
arbitration in first contract cases, this provision is unlikely to result in long-term
positive results for employees because arbitration and mediation would not be
required for negotiations of subsequent collective bargaining agreements.
First, the language of 8(h) is arguably ambiguous in stating that the dis-
pute must be referred to the "arbitration board established in accordance with
such regulations as may be prescribed by the Service." Accordingly, one could
surmise, from the plain language of the statute, that the FMCS would not be
required to prescribe such rules for forming and regulating such an arbitration
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board, and that the arbitration board could potentially be formed and regulated
under the authority of another person or agency, such as the NLRB or the Presi-
dent.
Second, because the current language of 8(h) is ambiguous in stating
how such an arbitration board would be formed and regulated, it is reasonable to
infer that whoever appoints or selects members could be influenced by political
ideologies, if the appointment of arbitration board could be made by political
appointees like the General Counsel and the five-member Board, or that the
arbitration board members, even if "neutral" public servants, could be influ-
enced by their own personal biases in making these binding arbitration deci-
sions. Furthermore, reviewing courts would likely find the NLRB's decision
regarding how these members should be appointed reasonable under Chevron.
322
Because both the five-member NLRB and the NLRB General Counsel are all
political-appointees, the particular ideologies followed by these political ap-
pointees could also factor into how the arbitration board is formed and regu-
lated. Therefore, the EFCA, as currently written, could have the effect of sub-
jecting workers to the political whims of the majority political party in power.
The great influence of such political ideologies, biases, and preferences, could
undoubtedly confound the problem that many experts, scholars, and politicians
complain causes inefficiency with current Board decisions-policy oscilla-
tion.323
Alternatively, even if neither the courts nor the five-member Board find
that permitting the NLRB to form and regulate the arbitration board is both rea-
sonable and permissible under Chevron, the decisions of this arbitration board
will not be immune to the biases of the arbitration board members. For exam-
ple, even if the FMCS is a more neutral body than the NLRB, there is potential
322 For an example of a pre-Chevron Supreme Court case indicating the deference due the
National Labor Relations Board, see NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221, 235-36 (1963).
("Accordingly, in view of the deference paid the strike weapon by the federal labor laws and the
devastating consequences upon it which the Board found was and would be precipitated by re-
spondent's inherently discriminatory super-seniority plan, we cannot say the Board erred in the
balance which it struck here. Although the Board's decisions are by no means immune from attack
in the courts as cases in this Court amply illustrate, its findings here are supported by substantial
evidence, its explication is not inadequate, irrational or arbitrary, and it did not exceed its powers
or venture into an area barred by the statute. The matter before the Board lay well within the
mainstream of its duties. It was attempting to deal with an issue which Congress had placed in its
hands and [w]here Congress has in the statute given the Board a question to answer, the courts
will give respect to that answer." Here, as in other cases, we must recognize the Board's special
function of applying the general provisions of the Act to the complexities of industrial life.. .and
of (appraising) carefully the interests of both sides of any labor management controversy in the
diverse circumstances of particular cases' from its special understanding of 'the actualities of
industrial relations.' [. .. ] 'The ultimate problem is the balancing of the conflicting legitimate
interests. The function of striking that balance to effectuate national labor policy is often a diffi-
cult and delicate responsibility, which the Congress committed primarily to the National Labor
Relations Board, subject to limited judicial review."') (citations omitted).
323 Gould, supra note 8, at 471 (discussing the mischief of the Bush Board and its use of policy
oscillation in overturning many Clinton Board decisions).
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for great discretion in determining how these disputes are to be arbitrated and
what standards will be used. Furthermore, even though a board appointed by
the FMCS is unlikely to be as prone to policy oscillation as the NLRB, 324 the
arbitration board members will inevitably have biases when making their deci-
sions. Therefore, although arbitration would permit more efficiency in dealing
with the current influx of 8(a)(5) violations in first contract cases, the results of
such arbitration are unlikely to always result in union and employee favorable
contracts that provide better health benefits, pensions, and wages, as the propo-
nents of the EFCA have alleged.325
Third, because the EFCA would permit mediation on the request of ei-
ther of the parties after ninety days of bargaining in good faith, and subse-
quently require the FCMS to refer the dispute to binding arbitration if an agree-
ment is not reached between the parties in the thirty day mediation period, both
unions and employers would have a great incentive to play hardball at the bar-
gaining table. Therefore, rather than encouraging resolution of differences be-
tween employers and unions, both unions and employers could have an incen-
tive to make outlandish offers and counteroffers at the bargaining table, because
8(d) only requires that the parties meet and convene at reasonable times and
confer in good faith.326 Furthermore, because under current case law there are
few instances where the Board has found that a party has not convened in good
faith,327 a party who believes that it would receive more favorable treatment
from the arbitration board decision than it would receive if it genuinely sought
to reach an agreement with the other party, would have a great incentive to play
hardball at the bargaining table. Moreover, because the arbitration board mem-
bers could be politically appointed positions, and even in the best case scenario
would be appointed as neutral public servants without inherent pro-business or
pro-labor biases, one cannot reasonably foresee whether this provision would
benefit workers or employers more.
324 See generally Ronald Turner, Note, Ideological Voting on The National Labor Relations
Board, 8 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 707 (2006); see also Claire Tuck, Note, Policy Formulation at
the NLRB: A Viable Alternative to Notice and Comment Rulemaking, 27 CARDOZO L. REv. 1117
(2005).
325 See Harkin, supra note 211; see also Remarks by Sen. Brown (D-OH), 153 CONG. REC.
S8285 (daily ed. June 22, 2007).
326 See, e.g., NLRB v. Ins. Agents' Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477, 484 (1960) ("However, the na-
ture of the duty to bargain in good faith thus imposed upon employers by §8(5) of the original Act
was not sweepingly conceived. The Chairman of the Senate Committee declared: 'When the em-
ployees have chosen their organization, when they have selected their representatives, all the bill
proposes to do is to escort them to the door of their employer and say, 'Here they are, the legal
representatives of your employees.' What happens behind those doors is not inquired into, and the
bill does not seek to inquire into it."' (citing Senator Walsh, 79 Cong. Rec. 7570, 7660 (1935)).
327 NLRB v. A-I King Size Sandwiches, Inc., 732 F.2d 872, 877 (11 th Cir. 1984) (finding that
it was reasonable for the Board to have made a finding of bad faith, and therefore a violation of
§8(a)(5), when the company insisted on proposals that were "unusually harsh and unreasonable"
that such proposals became "predictably unworkable.").
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Fourth, although the bill is entitled the "Employee Free Choice Act,"
the mediation and arbitration provisions could actually result in an agreement of
which the union-represented employees would not have approved. For instance,
if the terms of the agreement are not beneficial to employees, these employees
are still locked into the terms of the contract, because of the contract bar rule.328
Additionally, the contract bar rule would prevent employees from initiating a
secret ballot decertification 329 election to challenge the union's continuing ma-
jority during this two-year period. Moreover, dissatisfied employees could not
vote the union out through a card check or poll. Rather, these employees would
still have to utilize the secret-ballot decertification provisions of the Act.330 Fi-
nally, the solution provided in §8(h), which only requires such mediation and
arbitration in first-contract cases, is duct tape to remedy the current lack of
agreements resulting from collective bargaining in and of itself. This is so be-
cause even if the contractual terms determined by the arbitration boards give the
employees more favorable terms than they would have received by simply bar-
gaining in good faith with the employer, these employees could lose these fa-
vorable terms when the contract expired in two years and they were required to
bargain in good faith with the employer without the intervention of either a me-
diation or arbitration board.
Accordingly, rather than leaving the language of the statute the way it
was when its proponents introduced it into Congress in 2007, I would suggest
several modifications to the language of the bill that would generally permit the
328 "The Board's 'contract bar' doctrine, which is designed to promote stable labor relations,
generally bars an election among employees covered by a valid and operative collective bargain-
ing agreement of reasonable duration." HARPER, ESTREICHER & FLYNN, supra note 16, at 385. As
long as the contract is in writing, is properly executed, and contains "'substantial terms and condi-
tions of employment' sufficient 'to stabilize the bargaining relationship,' including a termination
date," then the fixed-term contract will bar a petition filed by a rival union or by an employer
seeking decertification for up to three years, even if the contract is for a longer period. Id. at 385-
86. Furthermore, a petition filed by a rival union, and employer, or employees seeking decertifi-
cation of the union according to the rules in § 9(c)(1)(A)(ii), must be filed in a narrow "window"
or "open period," which takes place no more than ninety days, but no less than sixty days before
the expiration of the collective bargaining agreement. Id. at 386. In the health care industry, there
is a one-hundred and twenty and ninety day window period, rather than a ninety to sixty day pe-
riod. Id. The general sixty day period, or the ninety day period in the health care industry, where
a decertification petition cannot be filed is referred to as the insulated period and is intended to
give the union and the employer time to negotiate the collective bargaining agreement without
rivalries or uncertainty. Id. at 386 (citations omitted).
329 See generally GORMAN & FINKIN, supra note 116, §§ 4.7-4.8, at 70-77. In the absence of a
contract, a union certified as the majority bargaining representative by a Board certified election
enjoys a one-year period of irrebuttable majority support. See Brooks v. NLRB, 348 U.S. 96, 104
(1954).
330 See generally GORMAN & FINKIN, supra note 116, § 4.6, at 67-69. Union members un-
happy with the union may petition for its decertification via §9(c)(1)(A)(ii), as long as the union is
abiding by the contract and certification year rules. These elections are performed by secret ballot
and require that at least thirty-percent of employers petition the Board for a decertification elec-
tion. See 29 U.S.C. § 159(c) (1) (A) (ii) (2008).
57
Phillips: Using the Employee Free Choice Act as Duct Tape: How Both Active
Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2008
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
Board, through specifically enumerated remedial powers, to require mediation
or arbitration only in certain circumstances. For example, I suggest that, as an
alternative to the language in H.R. 800, Congress should grant the Board the
authority to require arbitration of agreements only in circumstances where the
Board has found bad faith bargaining. Therefore, even though the Board al-
ready has a policy that promotes mediation,33' Congress should provide the
Board with the authority to use its discretion to require mediation or arbitration
when it finds behavior, on behalf of either party, that, although destructive to the
bargaining process, has not risen to the level of an §8(a)(5) violation for bad
faith bargaining. These remedies would likely promote the purpose of collec-
332tive bargaining and freedom of contract, while also providing remedial pow-
ers to the Board to correct egregious behavior. Furthermore, to remedy the po-
tential problem that could arise regarding who has the authority to form and
appoint members to the arbitration board, Congress should provide more ex-
press instructions within the statutory language itself that mirror the instructions
in Section 3 of the Act.
333
Overall, the only provisions of the EFCA that I believe would be effec-
tive in enforcing the right of workers to unionize are those provisions granting
stronger remedial powers to the Board so that it could sanction parties that vio-
late the Act. In addition to the remedial powers included in the EFCA as it was
introduced into Congress in 2007, Congress should grant the Board broader
remedial powers to enable the Board to sanction employers for multiple, re-
peated, and willful violations. Furthermore, instead of providing for permissive
mediation followed by required arbitration, Congress should grant the Board the
authority to require arbitration in cases where it finds that a party has either
failed to bargain in good faith or committed numerous hallmark violations
334
that could ordinarily permit the Board to grant a Gissel bargaining order. More-
over, the Board should continue encouraging parties to utilize arbitration in set-
tling disputes. These additional remedial powers would eliminate many of the
underlying problems that prompted labor leaders and politicians to propose the
331 See supra note 129 and accompanying text.
332 See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
333 Section 3(a) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 153(a) states:
•.. the Board shall consist of five instead of three members, appointed by the
President by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. Of the two addi-
tional members so provided for, one shall be appointed for a term of five years
and the other for a term of two years. Their successors, and the successors of
the other members, shall be appointed for terms of five years each, excepting
that any individual chosen to fill a vacancy shall be appointed only for the un-
expired term of the member whom he shall succeed. The President shall des-
ignate one member to serve as Chairman of the Board. Any member of the
Board may be removed by the President, upon notice and hearing, for neglect
of duty or malfeasance in office, but for no other cause.
29 U.S.C. § 153(a) (2007).
334 See supra note 298 and accompanying text.
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amendments in the EFCA that would have required the Board to both certify a
union based on a majority of signed authorization cards and require arbitration
and mediation in first contract settings.
V. REMOVING THE DUCT TAPE AND ADDRESSING THE REGULATORY
FAILURES: MOVING BEYOND LABOR LAW TO ADDRESS THE REGULATORY
FAILURE OF CURRENT LAWS
Although Congress undoubtedly needs to amend the NLRA to permit it
to function in the fashion that Senator Wagner envisioned, the pro-union stance
embodied in the EFCA is the improper way to adequately address the current
plight of American workers. Because America's society and economy have
changed so drastically since the enactment of the NLRA in 1935, both political
leaders and society in general must be progressive and make aggressive regula-
tory changes not only to aid both American businesses and workers, but also to
permit labor law to serve the function that Senator Wagner intended.
As is evident from the information presented regarding the current
number of Americans that are uninsured, Congress, the President and state leg-
islatures need to act,335 because having a high percentage of uninsured Ameri-
cans not only creates unhappiness for these workers, but also creates a less effi-
cient work force. "The upward trend in the number of uninsureds [sic] needs to
be reversed because many studies have shown that people who lack health in-
surance tend to forgo needed care until they become much sicker and go to ex-
pensive emergency rooms for treatment.',336 Additionally, an unhealthy work-
force can lead to inefficiency and even permanent disability or death of indi-
viduals who end up waiting until their condition has progressed too far before
seeking the medical treatment that would permit them to recover.337 Therefore,
an effective first step for Congress, in pursuing effective health care reform en-
tails amending ERISA to permit state legislatures to pass laws, such as the
Maryland Fair Share Act,338 that would require larger employers to stop pushing
the health care burden on taxpayers and workers. In addition, states should seek
to reform insurance laws that would either prohibit insurance companies from
increasing rates for small businesses beyond ten percent annually or prevent
insurance companies from considering the health of workers in small businesses
in any fashion when those insurance companies make rate determinations.
339
Congress should also consider passing laws that would enable the
United States Department of Labor to sanction firms that employ workers in
335 See supra notes 171-179 and accompanying text.
336 Bleak Findings, supra note 171.
337 See generally Gottschalk, supra note 96.
338 See supra notes 93-99 and accompanying text.
339 See supra notes 174-175.
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foreign countries in sub-standard labor conditions. 340 Transnational corpora-
tions such as Wal-Mart have abused their ability to compete globally by shifting
their orders to suppliers who have factories in areas with the cheapest work
forces. 341  For example, Wal-Mart has squeezed a garment supplier until it
closed a factory in the United States paying ten dollars an hour plus benefits,
then bought from a maquila in Mexico that paid $1.20 an hour without benefits,
then forced the maquila out of business because Wal-Mart could purchase gar-
ments for less from a supplier in China that pays its workers seventy-five cents
an hour, then forced the Chinese supplier to close its business when it found that
it could purchase the same garments from a supplier in Bangladesh that paid its
workers twenty-five cents an hour.342
In addition to my suggestion that Congress should provide the Board
with more effective remedial powers, 3 Congress should make the following
five amendments to the NLRA or other federal Acts in conflict with the NLRA,
to aid both American workers and businesses. First, Congress should seek to
congressionally overrule the Supreme Court's 5-4 decision in Hoffman Plas-
tics,344 by amending the Immigration Reform and Control Act ("IRCA")3 45 to
permit the NLRB to require that an employer who violates §8(a)(3) by discharg-
ing workers, who happen to be undocumented, to pay the back pay ordinarily
due to the worker discharged for union activities into the general fund at the
NLRB.346 This policy would not only prevent undocumented workers from
further benefiting from violating federal immigration laws, because such work-
ers will not be awarded back pay for their own unlawfulness, but also allow
employers that do follow federal immigration laws to compete more equally
with employers who do violate immigration laws. Second, I suggest amending
340 See generally Hubbard, supra note 146 (discussing, the myriad of ways that the United
States could seek to enforce a standard of rights internationally, especially when United States
corporations are abusing these labor markets abroad).
341 Tucker, supra note 3, at 148 (stating that currently, "international law has little or no influ-
ence on the direction of U.S. labor law, and there seems little prospect that courts will constitu-
tionalize labor rights or otherwise protect them through their power to interpret statutes and de-
velop the common law.").
342 See Hubbard, supra note 146.
343 See discussion supra Part IV.C.
344 Hoffman Plastics Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137 (2002).
345 Immigration Reform and Control Act ("IRCA"), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101 et. seq. (2007).
346 See Rachel Feltman, Note, Undocumented Workers in the United States: Legal, Political,
and Social Effects, 7 RiCH. J. GLOBAL L. & Bus. 65, 70-73 (2008) (noting that the fact that Con-
gress has not amended IRCA to alter the decision in Hoffman Plastics is unusual, given state
legislative trends that tend to "demonstrate increased tolerance and coverage for undocumented
alien workers."); see also Richard A. Johnson, Note, Twenty Years of the IRCA: The Urgent Need
for Updated Legislative Response to the Current Undocumented Worker Situation in the United
States, 21 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 239, 263-64 (2007) ("However, after Hoffnan, the Secretary of Labor
feared that the Supreme Court decision 'might enable companies to deny undocumented workers
the minimum wage, overtime pay, or even enable companies to refuse paying undocumented
workers altogether."'); see also September Massacre, supra note 15, at 6.
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the Act to require parties to comply with Board decisions while either party is
appealing the Board's decision or the Board is seeking an order for enforcement
in one of the Courts of Appeals.
Third, I would also suggest that Congress consider providing for longer
tenures for Board appointees, through amending Section 3 of the Act, so that
there would be less time spent dealing with Board vacancies.3 47 If the Board
members had longer tenures, then it is likely that there would not be as much of
a problem when vacancies occurred and cases could be heard in a more efficient
manner. Fourth, Congress should amend the definition of supervisor 348 in a
fashion that would permit more professional employees such as nurses and pro-
fessors349 to organize while only preventing true supervisors such as CEO's
from organizing. 350  Fifth, Congress should legislatively overrule the Board's
decisions in Brown University35' and Brevard Achievement Center, Inc.,352 by
expressly including such employees in the definition of employee, so that both
graduate assistants and disabled workers would be permitted to unionize.353
347 Gould, supra note 8, at 482 (former Board Chairman Gould states that in the 1990s he "pro-
posed that Board members have a longer term of office-seven or eight years-and be barred
from obtaining reappointment." He reasoned that this system "would give members more experi-
ence on the job and allow the public to get a better return on its investment. This would also
simultaneously insulate appointees who could focus on the work at hand, rather than preoccupy
themselves with the reappointment process.")
348 See Lofaso, supra note 34, at 63 (advocating that "Congress should also redefine the term
employee more broadly to reinclude supervisors, independent contractors, and managers.").
349 See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
350 During the 1st Session of the 110th Congress, proponents in the Senate of such an amend-
ment introduced The RESPECT (Re-empowerment of Skilled and Professional Employees and
Construction Tradesworkers Act) Act, S. 969, 110th Cong. (1st Sess. 2007), to amend the defini-
tion of supervisor under the NLRA. This provision would have amended
the National Labor Relations Act to revise the definition of "supervisor" in the
following ways: (1) require the individual to have authority over employees
for a majority of the individual's worktime; and (2) remove authority to assign
other employees and to responsibly direct employees as conditions for being
considered a supervisor.
RESPECT Act, S. 969, 110th Cong. (1 st Sess. 2007).
351 342 N.L.R.B. 483 (2004) (overruling N.Y. Univ., 332 N.L.R.B. 1205 (2000), and holding
that graduate assistants could not unionize under the NLRA).
352 342 N.L.R.B. 982 (2004) (determining that because their work was "rehabilitative," rather
than genuine employment, disabled workers could not unionize under the NLRA, while their non-
disabled co-workers could unionize).
353 See Gould, supra note 8, at 471-72 (stating that Brevard Achievement Center is "certainly
high on the list of the more ludicrous Bush II Board's decisions and contrary to [Board] cover-
age.. .of so-called free world workers.. .and hardly consistent with the United State's attempt to
bring the disabled into the mainstream of the employment relationship, as manifested by the
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990." Former Chairman Gould also stated that the Brown
University decision was also ludicrous in denying protection to contingent employees). Id. See
also September Massacre, supra note 15, at 3 (discussing the Bush Board's efforts to narrowly
construe the definition of employee).
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In addition to the structural amendments that I believe Congress should
make to the NLRA and other Congressional Acts, the American people must
truly push their representatives to seek social change. Americans should be able
to compete with workers in other countries on a more equal playing field, with-
out having to sacrifice much needed health care and pension benefits.
First and foremost, the right to unionize should be given meaning be-
cause unionization can only work effectively when the United States not only
enforces that right in a genuine fashion, through providing stronger remedial
powers to the NLRB, but also permits American workers to compete on a more
level playing field.
Furthermore, Congress should explore options for providing universal
or nearly universal health care for all Americans. This would encourage a more
efficient workforce and enable more working families to retain their homes, as
an increasing amount of American families are forced into foreclosure and
bankruptcy because of mounting medical bills and increasing health care premi-
ums. American workers deserve more than they currently have for their hard
work. If Congress does not reform current laws and enact new laws that can aid
in providing a better standard of living for working Americans, then I fear that
standard of living for most working Americans will continue to deteriorate to
the point that the system cannot be repaired.
VI. CONCLUSION
To be sure, some provisions of the EFCA, such as arming the Board
with stronger remedies to combat employer unfair labor practices, will aid in
improving the quality of life for American workers and their families. But, as
this Note has shown, even the strong EFCA provisions will not have the drastic
positive effects on the lives of American workers that the Wagner Act had be-
cause the societal realities that existed at the time Congress passed NLRA in
1935 have greatly changed.
A vital part of improving the standard of living of American workers
involves providing a system that permits unionization, while protecting pro-
union workers from the discriminatory practices of their employers. But, too
much emphasis has been placed on drastic reform to American labor law, and
not enough emphasis has been placed on either improving the plight of the
American worker or factoring workers' rights into an analysis of improving the
American economy. Just as the average American can no longer rely on Social
Security to provide for them in their old age, working class Americans should
not rely as much on the NLRA to remedy the plight of the American worker.
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Even if Congress never passes the EFCA or a similar bill,354 historians
will likely view the introduction of the bill for its importance in opening up the
channels of vigorous debate that will continue to advance ideas to benefit work-
ers.355 This is so even though EFCA supporters in the Senate failed to rally up
the sixty votes needed for cloture in 2007.356 But, the EFCA was just the begin-
ning because working America definitely needs change to alleviate its current
burdens.357 Labor rights activists in Congress should continue to push for
amendments to the NLRA that could provide stronger remedies against employ-
ers who unlawfully seek to prevent lawful unionization. However, Congress
should turn away from drastic reform to the NLRA, including EFCA's proposed
provision that could potentially require arbitration of all first-contract cases and
require that the NLRB certify a union as the majority bargaining representative
on the showing of a simple majority of employee-signed union authorization
cards.
Additionally, Congress should focus on improving the plight of Ameri-
can workers through providing either free or government-subsidized universal
health care, revising federal immigration laws and ERISA, and enacting other
laws that would discourage American companies that are obtaining goods and
services abroad from abusing other labor markets. I believe these changes
would encourage businesses to stay in the United States, rather than outsourcing
or off-shoring jobs that could be available to American workers. Simply put,
these changes would permit American workers to compete more effectively in a
global economy.
The EFCA is just a starting point. Although passive and active deregu-
lation of American labor law prohibited the EFCA from being more than con-
gressional duct tape for the ailments of working America, the EFCA does pro-
vide a starting point for implementing change to benefit the American working
354 Greg Clouser & Brian Mumaugh, Senate Blocks Bill to Eliminate Secret-Ballot Representa-
tion Elections, 16 COLORADO EMPLOYMENT L. LETTER 9, 9 (2007) ("Despite the bill's defeat this
term, proponents have proposed to revive it in the next Congress. President George W. Bush has
stated that he will veto the legislation if it reaches his desk.").
355 Anya Sostek, Unions, Business Pulling Out All the Stops, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, June
21, 2007. ("'This is, like it or not, how business gets done,' said Larry Cohen, president of the
Communications Workers of America," commenting on how getting both the House of Represen-
tatives to pass the bill and getting knowledge of the problems facing workers seeking to unionize,
is a "process that is measured in years, not months."). Id.
356 153 CONG. REC. S8398 (daily ed. June 26, 2007). The vote for cloture was 51 yeas to 48
nays, just nine votes short of cloture. Vote No. 227, 153 CONG. REc. S 8398 (daily ed. June 26,
2007).
357 See Harold Meyerson, Kickstarting the Economy; Unfortunately, The Same Old Remedies
Won't Work This Time. We Need Big, FDR-Scale Remedies, PITTSBURGH POST-GAzETTE, Jan. 20,
2008, at GI (discussing how the current Bush tax cut is insufficient to help American workers,
and after over three decades of deregulation, America needs FDR-Scale remedies).
358 See generally ELLEN DANNIN, TAKING BACK THE WORKER'S LAW: How To FIGHT THE
ASSAULT ON LABOR RIGHTS (2006).
63
Phillips: Using the Employee ree Choice Act as Duct Tape: How Both Active
Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2008
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
class. Accordingly, Congress should not only amend the NLRA to make proc-
esses more efficient and deter employers from violating workers' rights to or-
ganize, but also focus on other obvious problems such as health care reform and
outsourcing.
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